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Carol Mills, Tom Ward, & Paul White
24 February, 2007 – Arlington, VA
Interviewer, Editor – Paul Hillmer
Transcribers – Diane Schuessler, Paul Hillmer
All black and white photographs by Paul White, unless otherwise noted

Paul White, Carol Mills, and Tom Ward all served at Sam Thong as part of the USAID program in Laos.
They gathered in the home of Carol Mills to reminisce about their experiences.

Paul White, Carol Mills, and Tom Ward were all USAID staff in Laos during the Secret War, and all worked
closely with Edgar “Pop” Buell. In this interview each of them shares the details of how they came to work in Laos,
what responsibilities they had, and their impression of Buell. They describe their own responsibilities, the various
aspects of the USAID program (education, health, refugee services), different individuals involved in the operation, and
the program’s eventual evacuation from Sam Thong and relocation to Ban Xoun.
[The four were chatting about things in general when Carol Mills started talking about Hmong who
came to Edgar “Pop” Buell’s funeral.]
(0:00) I’m starting this thing because you’re telling a good story.
CM: No, but there were Hmong who came, Hmong who had worked with Pop, with their children
who had lived in the US for many years by then, and the old Hmong or the older Hmong were
always saying ‘when we go back to Laos’—and these younger Hmong were saying to us, ‘No way!’
[Laughs] ‘We’re never going back to Laos!’ And there was a generation gap—and that was ’80, ’81
he died. Yeah, so I’ve seen that.
[Interviewer asks if there is any more information he can provide to the three before formally
beginning the interview. They say no, so they proceed.]
CM: And so this is going to—you said there is a Hmong Cultural Center at the University. Is this
for that?
[Hillmer explains about Concordia University’s Center for Hmong Studies, which is co-located with
the Hmong Nationality Archives. He pauses the recorder. When it’s turned back on, Paul White is
explaining that digital copies of all his photographs were donated to the Hmong Cultural Resource
Center, also in St. Paul.]

PW: And I’m not sure about the Hmong Studies Center. I’m on a board that does thesis review of
scholarly Hmong research. So every year I get like 15 or 18 documents to read and comment on as
part of an early review process, so that’s—yeah, they really run the gamut of topics—but really
interesting.
CM: I have a question off the record. [Recorder is paused.]
(1:42) Why don’t we just go ahead and start by having each of you tell how you got involved
in USAID—or maybe it was IVS [International Voluntary Services] first, or whatever it was
that took you in the direction of ending up in Laos in the ‘60s?
TW: In 1962 I was Assistant Director of Admissions at the University of Texas. I was doing some
graduate work, and also working there part-time. And then an interviewer who was on campus
recruiting people for Southeast Asia—it was a new program in AID, and they were looking for
people who wanted to go to Laos and Vietnam. And the—that was my first contact. He asked if
I’d be interested and I said yes, so I applied and was accepted. And there was a group of 18 that
were selected: six for Laos, and 12 for Vietnam. USAID sent us to Berkeley for a special Southeast
Asia Studies program at UC-Berkeley. (This was in the fall of 1962.) We had Area Studies for
Southeast Asia, Economic Studies some specific studies on Thailand and Laos, Vietnam [Pauses]
and then the focus of our work was primarily as community development advisors. In other words,
we’d go out and work in rural areas with communities—in some cases with hill tribes, and in some
cases with the low—the main ethnic group. But it would be in rural areas, not in the capital city, and
we’d be working for USAID. We also got language training there from the Army Language School
at Monterey. They would send a teacher up to give us language training in Lao or Vietnam. In that
group—in the Vietnamese group there was Richard Holbrook, who was later Ambassador to the
United Nations, and was involved in—I think the Paris Accords or the Geneva Accords in the
1970s, I guess. But he went to Vietnam as a [Pauses] and worked with the accords. The six of us
went to Laos, and we were spread around the country. I went to Laos in sixty—I think early ’63,
and I was assigned up north with Pop Buell, with the Hmong refugees. We were working with
refugee relief and resettlement of tribal people who had been displaced by the war in north Laos.
Others in our group were assigned to other areas of Laos: some to Pakse, some to Vientiane, some
to Tha Khek, some to Paksane—different areas around the country.
(5:12) PW: Good. Well, I’ll start. I grew up in a small town in Indiana. My mother was American
Indian, my father was African American, and the town was virtually all white. Indiana is the biggest
KKK state outside of the Solid South, and I was an only child, so I grew up not having a lot of
playmates or friends.
So, I grew up reading a lot for companionship. One day, probably in junior high school, I went to a
library where I read a book by Lafcadio Hearn on Japan. I fell in love with Japan. From then I read
every book I could find on Japan. I sought out Japanese pen pals and studied everything that I
could about Buddhism, about Japan and about Asia.
When I graduated from high school I was awarded a four-year fellowship to the University of
Michigan, but that was way too close to home for an only child [Interviewer chuckles], and it wasn’t
in the direction of Japan at all [Chuckles]. So I went to California to college. After two years, my
father had a heart attack and I returned to Indiana to finish college. I went to Valparaiso University,
a Lutheran university.

The dean of my academic department was a Nipponophile so we got along great. When I graduated
he said, ‘You should consider going to the East-West Center.’ I did, on a two-year graduate
fellowship. I studied East Asian Studies. Under that program, I went to Japan, where I quickly
learned that the Japan of Lafcadio Hearn had long since disappeared [Interview chuckles], and I
experienced more prejudice in Japan than I’d ever seen in southern Indiana.
While on that trip, and as part of my East-West Center program field study program, I traveled to
Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Thailand, Taiwan and Hong Kong. In Thailand, I went to Chiang Mai
where I saw the Hmong for the first time. I decided then and there that Japan was past history and
that I would do anything I could to return to Southeast Asia and work with the Hmong.
After I finished my East-West Center program I came to Washington looking for a job. I applied to
any program I could apply to, including the CIA. The only criterion was that they had to have a
program in Southeast Asia. I didn’t get any offers. I’m sure I flunked the psychological profile for
the CIA. [Interviewer, others laugh]
One day I was walking down the street feeling sorry for myself when I saw a friend from the
University of Hawaii - Jack Parmenter. I said, ‘Jack! What are you doing in Washington?’ He said,
‘Oh, I’ve joined this group called IVS and I’m going to Laos.’ ‘You’ve got to be kidding me!’
[Chuckles] I went with Jack to the IVS office. Soon I was signed up to go to Laos.
We didn’t get all the training that Tom got. We received five days of intensive Lao, 12 hours a day
and we had an orientation in Coolfont, West Virginia. IVS had lots of experts, including an
anthropologist, who gave us area studies briefings. Then we were off to Laos.
IVS had promised me that I would work with the Hmong. When I arrived in Vientiane, I found
that IVS had two programs: an education program and a rural development program. None of
those programs worked with the Hmong. I was assigned to Dong Dok Teacher College in
Vientiane, working on the education team. The IVS education chief, Bernie Wilder, was a really
good guy. He knew that I desperately wanted to work with the Hmong. He first got me out of the
University by assigning me to the Asia Foundation. I worked there for two or three months while
the bureaucratics of being assigned to Sam Thong were worked out. Eventually my assignment was
approved and I went to Sam Thong to work for Pop Buell.
I was greeted upon my arrival in Sam Thong by Carol [Mills]—
(9:07) And when would this have been?
That was in the fall of 1966. In Sam Thong, I worked in education. When an opportunity opened
for me to work with refugees, I moved from the Sam Thong school complex and moved over to the
airstrip where I worked more directly with Carol and Pop on refugee matters.
(9:31) OK. [Pauses] And Carol?
Right. Well, I grew up in West Virginia in a little town, and I joined a program called BVS—
Brotherhood Volunteer Service, which was through my church, and was assigned to Washington,
and through that met Dr. Nofzinger, who was head of IVS, and he said, ‘When you’re finished, why
don’t you come work for me?’ And so I went to IVS as a secretary in Washington and they had a lot

of big contracts at the time. And so I worked—I was also his accountant; I kind of did everything
administrative—and met the AID people, and one of the AID people said, ‘Gee, you make nothing
working here! Why don’t you join AID and go to Laos? I’m going to Laos to work, and you could
go as my secretary.’ So I filled out the papers, I gave them to him—I’ve always remembered,
Thanksgiving Day—and they called me that next week and said, ‘You’ve been accepted. Can you
start in December?’ And I was stunned! I said, ‘No, [Laughing] I can’t start in December!’ So I
started January, and they gave me three weeks’ training, and then they said,. ‘Well, we can’t keep you
any longer, because you have to go to Laos. They’re desperate for secretaries.’ And that’s how I
ended up in Laos. I worked in the rural development office, and of course knew Tom [Ward], who
was upcountry, knew Pop—anybody who worked out in the fields came to our office and I met
them, and when I was getting ready to leave after my two years, I jokingly said to Pop—because he’d
invited me to Sam Thong—if you ever need a secretary, call me and I’ll come work for you. So
before I left, he’d worked out he could get a secretary. So [All laugh] but they told me what they
told Tom years earlier: ‘Whatever you do, don’t change his wording, because he had his own way of
wording things—
Oh, indeed!
—if you’ve read any of his papers. So I went on home leave and went to work in Sam Thong in
October of ’65. As Mike [Lynch] mentioned, I was the first American woman there in the office.
We had a nurse there, Diana Dick. Has anybody mentioned her? You should get in touch with her.
I have her name and number. And her husband Terry worked with Mike, so they were both up in
that area. But anyway, Dee was the nurse, and I was the secretary, and we kind of had our two lives.
She worked at the hospital and was wonderful, and I went to
work and set up this office in Sam Thong where, admittedly
when I first went, they didn’t accept women in the office.
Women were supposed to not be in an office, they were
supposed to be home. And I remember sitting there and
somebody coming in wanting something like a pencil, and
they wouldn’t say anything, they’d just stand in front of my
desk. And when one of the men would walk in, they’d say,
‘Could you give me a pencil?’ and the guy would turn to me
and say, ‘Hey, Carol, where’s a pencil?’ [Laughs] and then I’d
give it to them. But then that changed, because the longer I
worked, the more they realized that women can do things,
Dee Dick (R) with nurse and Xieng
and they don’t fall to pieces. But there were cultural
Khouang
Education Director’s wife
differences. In fact, I have a letter I’d written summarizing
two years, which I’ll let you read—
Oh, thank you!
—but one of the naikongs who worked with us, Nhia Ying, who later died, used to take me to his
house, and I would talk with his wife, and he was taking a second wife. And I was very upset,
[Laughing] you know, growing up in an American culture, and I said to his wife, ‘Aren’t you upset
Nhia Ying’s taking another wife?’ And she said (this is very limited language, but basically she said),
‘Oh no, it’ll make my life so much easier. One of us will work in the field, one of us will watch the
children, and I don’t have to do both.’ So you realized there are different ways of looking at things.
Absolutely.
(14:34) Well, we could take this in a number of different directions, but let’s start—and
Paul, you said specifically, in Chiang Mai already, you met the Hmong and decided, ‘OK,
the Japanese are passé, this is where I’m going. And I'm sure both of you as well could

come up with stories about these people. And we don’t need to focus our attention only on
the Hmong, because obviously there were other very important groups of people who were a
part of this operation, but what were your impressions of the Hmong people as you met
them and got to know them? What drew you to them, or maybe [Laughs] didn’t—maybe in
some cases repulsed you a little bit?
(15:13) PW: My initial meeting with Hmong was at Chiang Mai; it was a tourist encounter. We
went out to a Hmong village. Several things impressed me. One, it was probably the first time I’d
been to a rural village outside of the United States. My first impression was that the Hmong villages
were very much like the way my mother’s side of the family lived in Alabama.
As a kid I hated to go to visit our relatives in Alabama because they were sharecroppers living in
huts on stilts way up off the ground. The Tom Bigbee River flooded every year. When water was
high, they’d take their pigs and chickens up into their houses. So, first of all, [Pauses] the houses in
Thailand and Laos looked very familiar to me - houses on stilts. Just seeing the way the people
lived, especially the Hmong, I felt like I was back in Alabama. That was kind of nice after Japan – it
had become Western in so many ways. I was taken by village life, and I really wanted to spend at
least some time living in villages. So that was probably the thing that most attracted me.
The Hmong were very colorful and very different. I was looking for excitement and adventure and
there was a sense that excitement and adventure abounded in Hmong-dom. Now, I had lots of first
experiences and impressions at Sam Thong that I’ll save until later in the interview – experiences
with both the Hmong and with the American community there [Interviewer laughs]. But, I’ll stop
there so you can continue your theme with someone else.
(17:05) TW: My feeling [Pauses] my first impression of the Hmong when I went up to Sam Thong
in early ’63 with Pop being there—and he’d been there for a year or two and got along well with
the—Sam Thong at this point was a feeding center, it was an air strip, and south of the air strip was
a hut where Pop and I lived—it was a grass hut with bamboo walls, grass roof, a dirt floor. Next to
the living quarters was a rice warehouse, and we stored bags of rice there for rice drops. Some
would come directly out of Vientiane, some would be landed there, and we would deliver them in
STOL [short take-off and landing] aircraft, these Helio Couriers and Pilatus Porters. And of course,
Air America was our transportation. We didn’t have any—there were no roads up there at that
point, and the only way to get to this area was by plane. So at any rate, getting back to the Hmong,
the Hmong—this was a Hmong village, and it was built on the side of a hill. And at the bottom of
the hill was the air strip where we lived. But my first impression of them was they were very
independent people, kind of fiercely independent, and they were very forthright. They would tell
you exactly what they felt about things. This was unlike the Lao, who were much more reticent, and
being Buddhist, they were very careful about feelings and traditions, and a lot of times they wouldn’t
be very frank with you, and they’d say—you’d have to get to know them a long to really try to figure
out what they were saying—or what they meant. They might say one thing and mean another thing.
This was not my impression of the Hmong, though. They were very forthright, and would tell you
exactly what they felt about most things. And, of course, they were animists primarily, and spirits
were very important to them. And you’d have to understand—but that was hard to get, to know
how that worked in their society, and the place of spirits and the traditions that they had, whether it
was marriage or burial or birth or whatever, these were—they had certain ways of doing things [such
as] where they built their house, and spirits were always, usually invoked in these kinds of
ceremonies, and ceremonies were very important to them. So this was hard for someone, a

Westerner, to understand. And fortunately, I had a guide, Pop Buell, who’d been there and knew
them well and was well-liked by them, so that made it easier for me.
(20:43) CM: It’s hard—I just remember them as being really hard-working. Hours didn’t seem to
matter; if they were needed, they were there. I also found them very helpful and very kind to me.
They would help me all the time—you know, if they thought I didn’t understand something. (I
spoke some Lao, but not very well.) They would always come over to help me understand. We had
a couple guides in the office who spoke very good English, and I just found them helpful and kind.
(21:27) Well, you’ve all mentioned him already, so let’s just go ahead and talk about him—
and that’s Pop Buell, a man who looms larger than life in practically every piece of literature
that’s been written about the Secret War. All of you worked with him, all of you, I assume,
got to know him reasonably well. What things have you maybe seen or heard or read that
you’d like to confirm or add to, and what things have you maybe seen or heard or read that
you think are maybe a little unfair or at least need to be modified or refined a little bit? Or if
you just have a good old story… [Laughs]
(22:02) CM: I don’t know. To me, Pop had the most—the best common sense of anybody I ever
worked with. And that’s—he went on that. We were a young group; when we were there—we were
a large group. There were 68 of us. When Tom was there, [to Ward] there were two of you alone—
TW: Yeah.
CM: —working with him. But we would go headstrong and do things, but Pop would always take
the blame. [Interviewer chuckles] Pop would always say, ‘It was my fault, I did it.’ He never—and
then he would say to us calmly, ‘You know, Carol, you really shouldn’t have done that.’ I mean, I
wrote—
(22:43) What might be an example of that?
I wrote a memo once, because I was always writing memos and signing his name—and people were
not supposed to come to Sam Thong without permission, and this guy had. So I wrote a memo,
signing Pop’s name, saying ‘You shouldn’t have come. The rules are’—and I laid them out. Well
this guy got really angry and called up and laid Pop out on the radio. And Pop kept saying, ‘You’re
right, I’m sorry.’ And yet he never once said, ‘I don’t know what you’re talking about!’ even though
he didn’t because I just did things like that. But also, in the heat of the moment, when choppers and
planes were coming and going, and you had all of these people trying to—saying ‘We’ve got to do
this, we’ve got to do that,’ Pop would say, ‘We’ll do this, we’ll do that,’ and he was just invariably
right. He just was able to direct us right paths. I really admired
Pop, so I [Pauses] and we spent a lot of time talking. When he
had problems, he used to come to talk them out with me.
Sometimes I wasn't sure what he was talking about, and I felt
stupid! I’d think, ‘When is he going to realize I’m not giving
him any help? I’m sitting here smiling and saying, ‘That sounds
right.”’ And it wasn’t ‘til years later that I realized he didn’t
want any input from me, [PW, PH chuckle] he just needed to
sound them out and make his own decisions, but to have
somebody who would listen. But I spent a lot of time with
Pop. He did a lot—
Carol Mills and Pop Buell

(24:40) TW: In those days we had some very hard chargers. Pop was a hard charger, and he was
working for the Meo people. And that was his goal, to help them. He would do just about anything
he could, legally or illegally, to get assistance for them. And when people were complaining in
Vientiane, ‘Well why are you doing this and why is he getting this?’ and all that sort of thing, he
would go right to the top. He was not a bureaucrat; he cut—he was an Indiana farmer. He was also
very independent and would fight for what he thought was right. And if he needed something, and
the bureaucracy, the USAID bureaucracy got in the way, he’d go right to the top. He’d go to Charlie
Mann, who was another hard charger, or the Ambassador, who was another hard charger, and he
would not—he would sometimes send me to Vientiane. If we weren't getting enough support, he
would send me to Vientiane—put me on a plane and send me down there and say, ‘Go see Charlie
Mann tonight. This is what I want you to tell him, and tell him we’ve got to have this right away.’
Or I’ve done that, I’ve taken messages directly to the Ambassador and told him, ‘This is what Pop
says,’ and of course the Ambassador might be in some diplomatic function. But it was all right, they
would always accept when Pop sent a message, they’d follow up. And he had great support, and
that’s what made him so effective; he had very good support from the head of USAID and also
from the Ambassador and other officials down there. But he was a very complicated man, too. For
example, when Paul and I went up there—at least with me, and I think with Paul as well—they
would send someone up to work with him, and he’d try you out. [PW chuckles] He wasn’t—you
know, you had to pass a lot of tests, being initiated. I mean, he would put you through all sorts of
things before he’d select you and allow you to stay. And some people he sent back after a few days’
trial.
(27:07) What might be a couple examples of things he might put you through?
TW: Well, one thing he would do, he said [Pauses] ‘I want you to go to over to Ma Na and check
out the refugee situation and tell me what their needs are, and [Pauses] report back here the day after
tomorrow.’ And he said, ‘The Helio over there will take you over,’ and this is only about a 15minute flight, if that long. And I said, ‘Well, what time is the plane coming back to pick me up?’
And he said, ‘It’s not.’ He said, ‘You’re walking back.’ And—you know, here’s a greenhorn who’s
never been—certainly never been in the hills of Laos, and this is very mountainous territory and
it’s—you know, some people would call it jungle, but this is not like in a tropical jungle so much as it
is kind of a hilly jungle—I don’t know what you’d call it, Paul, but at any rate, he said, ‘But I’m not
going to send you by yourself, I’m going to send Tong Sar with you.’ Tong Sar was a Lao assistant
who was another character, who spoke pretty good English, he understood the Hmong well, and he
[Pop] said, ‘If you have any questions, just follow him. And once you get over there, they’ll give you
a Hmong to come back with you,’ so at any rate, this is what happened. I went over, I got the
information, the refugee information we needed, and then we started hiking back. And it was a
couple of days before we got back to Sam Thong, but—you know. [All chuckle] And I—even my
canteen [All laugh] got awfully heavy climbing those hills, because it is up and down and up and
down and up and down!
(29:16) PW: Well, that’s actually a good lead-in to my impressions of Pop, because my impressions
are perhaps a little different. That is because I perhaps underwent more tests than most.
When I landed at Sam Thong and met Pop, he gave me two ultimatums immediately. The first
thing he said was, ‘There used to be a guy—a black guy up here — he didn’t say a black guy. He
probably said, ‘There used to be a Negro up here with White Star. He was a medic, worked with the
hospital. That guy fooled around with one of the Hmong girls.’ Pop said that it took everything he

could do to, with all of his knowledge and friends, to get that guy on an airplane to Vientiane before
the Hmong killed him.
So rule number one, Pop said, “Don’t do anything with the girls. Don’t even look at them. Don’t
ever go near the hospital because still that issue hasn’t been resolved.’
Then Pop pointed way across the valley at these buildings over there, and said, ‘That’s a school over
there, and that’s where you belong. Rule Number Two is that you don’t ever come to this air strip.
There are things that go on up here at this airstrip that you don’t need to know about, you don’t
want to know about. So there it is over there, that’s the school.’
There was no introduction of me to my counterpart - Moua Lia – the Education Chief for Xieng
Khouang Province. Pop just said, ‘There it is over there—the school.’ And it was my job to walk
across the valley to the school, find a place to stay, find people to talk to, and figure out what I was
supposed to do.
There are more Pop Buell stories, but I won’t go into that [CM chuckles]. So that was my first test.
I know now that Pop didn’t leave a lot of things to chance. I had been trying to get to Sam Thong
for two or three months in Vientiane. I’m sure that Pop had checked me out and had a good idea of
who I was and what my potential was before agreeing to let me come to his “empire.” But, the
impression I got when I arrived was that he was surprised to see that I was black.
The second day I was there—and I don’t know if you remember this, Carol—Carol invited me to
her house for dinner. When I arrived, Pop was there along with two or three pilots. They were
playing poker. And they played big-stakes poker in Sam Thong. They asked if I wanted to play
poker. I said, ‘I really don’t know how to play cards,’ I said, ‘but I’m a magician among other
things—it’s my hobby, so I try not to play cards cause it’s always a temptation.” [All laugh]
So I sat over in one corner of the room with Carol and watched these guys play big stakes poker.
One of the first things out of Pop’s mouth was in response to someone making a small bet – “Oh,
that’s just a nigger bet.’
Ah…
(32:03) PW: I thought, oh my god, what have I gotten myself into? Anyway, I survived that
evening – thinking back on it now I’m sure it was yet another of Pop’s tests to see what my
temperament was like. I returned to the school after an excellent meal – what a cook Carol is – even
in such a primitive place as Sam Thong. Eventually, one of Pop’s refugee workers, Don Sjostrom,
was killed at Na Khang, Lima Site 36. That brought about a shift in personnel.
I’d been at the school long enough for Pop to fully assess me. I had learned Lao really well, and I
got along with everybody and everyone liked me. I had stayed away from the Hmong girls at the
hospital as well. So, one day Pop drove across the valley to the school in his jeep. He said, ‘How
would you like to work up at the air strip with refugees?’ And that was it. [CM chuckles]
All of a sudden I was up at the air strip working with refugees, what I had come to Laos to do. I
had a wonderful time at the school - I mean, I really loved working there, but that was not why I
went to Sam Thong. I did fall in love with the things that could be done with and for the Hmong
kids and teachers at that school. I built a track, a basketball court, and I bought every kind of sports

equipment and taught the Hmong about many different sports. The Hmong were tremendous
athletes. They’d never really seen sports before like basketball, but almost immediately they picked
up the game.
In my program, I had supported the building of rural schools all around the Hmong area.
Upgrading their rickety schools and teaching the Hmong teachers to build sturdy school furniture,
blackboards and education materials was wonderful work. When Pop came to the school he saw
that I put my heart into my work, even if it wasn’t why I originally wanted to come to Sam Thong.
I was doing everything I could to make the Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua school systems the best
that they could be in the war circumstance. That was probably what Pop saw and appreciated in me.
I didn’t play politics; I didn’t try to get involved in things that were not assigned to me, I just did my
job. And I believe that Pop really appreciated people who had a mission and they did what they
were supposed to do with passion.
So [Pauses] you know, Pop was a pretty crude guy. He could make a sailor blush with his “street”
language. He was very direct and a great but very “down-to-earth” communicator. His hero was
Will Rogers, another very simple but effective communicator. One of Pop’s favorite sayings was,
‘There’s no fool like an educated fool.’
CM: That’s true! [TW agrees]
(33:55) PW: So the guys who came to Sam Thong and left really quickly because they didn’t fit in
were guys who were pretentious, who were trying to be something they were not.
I remember [Chuckling] a young State Department officer came to Sam Thong. I think his name
was J. Scott Oglethorpe—the Third. [Interviewer chuckles] The embassy had been trying so hard to
get someone to work where Pop was, so they could maybe keep an eye on him, I suppose. Anyway,
Scott Oglethorpe came to Sam Thong. He was proud of the fact that he had a black Volkswagen in
Vientiane with super horns on it. Black was diplomatic, and he could use the air horns to blast the
Lao off of the street when he was driving around Vientiane.
I don’t know how long he lasted, but it was probably a matter of hours before Pop had put him on
the plane. [Interviewer chuckles] But yes, Pop was very direct, and he always went with his
excellent understanding of what was “common sense.” I used to watch Pop when there was
something really difficult to deal with, like some military action that was generating refugees and
whether he should send one of his officers into a conflict area to work with those refugees. Pop
would first consult. He’d bring all the different Hmong staff in, sometimes one at a time, sometimes
two or three at a time.
Pop would listen to what everybody had to say, and then he would make a decision. The Hmong
understood that approach, and even if they didn’t necessarily agree with the decision, they would
support it because of the way it was made, through consultation with them, and because of the
transparency of the process. They all treated Pop like one of their naikong of naikongs. He was the
final arbiter and decision-maker.
That was incredible being that Pop was an “outsider” to their culture. I have not seen many people
who could so totally become a part of a different culture, understanding implicitly what to do, what

not to do, how to act and respond, and doing it all naturally. I think it was that his personality “fit”
with that of a traditional Hmong leader so he was able to do those things naturally, authentically
from inside of himself, but his actions were understood and accepted because they “fit.”
Pop would consult with General Vang Pao on activities that were way beyond his scope— like
military stuff [PH, TW chuckle]. It was the common sense that helped. He did it all!
(35:44) TW: You know, I was just thinking, if he’d been back in southern Indiana, he'd be just kind
of an ordinary guy at the coffee shop. But in northern Laos, he was a real leader, and it just goes to
show you—you know, talents that he had that he probably couldn’t demonstrate in Indiana he could
sure demonstrate in Laos. So he was very well-trusted, and he was a very good leader, a very
dynamic personality.
(36:17) How do you explain this rapport that he had with the Hmong people? As you said,
they treated him like the elder statesman almost.
PW: It didn’t come from language ability. [CM and TW laugh] It probably came a bit from cultural
understanding. Pop was a very simple person, and the Hmong were very simple people. “I’m just
an Indiana farmer,” Pop would tell them, and you are just Xieng Khouang farmers. We know each
other well. Farmers are farmers, where ever they are from.
TW: Right.
PW: —and somehow that just really meshed together. Pop was a listener. I have a picture of Pop,
where he’s standing at a microphone talking. You think of Pop as a talker, but he was more than a
talker and a blaster, he was a listener. His style of operation just fit really well with the way that the
Hmong did things.
And, of course, the Hmong saw Pop as someone who could provide and deliver. There were planes
coming in full of rice, there was medical equipment and supplies at the hospital, Hmong were being
trained in the clincs and schools, and Pop was the main reason for all of that happening. When
something happened, the first people on the scene were the refugee guys working for Pop. So the
Hmong saw him as someone who could really make things happen – someone who they could
depend on when an action was needed.
Pop would sometimes say, ‘By god, they can’t do that! I’ll talk to the Ambassador. I’ll get that
policy changed!’ He’d go storming off to Vientiane, or he’d send someone down with a strong
message written in his Indiana farmer language. The next day, whatever it was, was resolved in
Pop’s favor, the way that Pop had presented it to the Hmong. So he was seen as someone who
could make something happen.
(37:39) CM: And I think the respect started out earlier because of his age. You know, the Hmong
were people who respected age. And also, Pop, because of his caring of the Hmong, he always had
candy in his pocket. We never got out at a stop where Pop wasn’t throwing out candy. He had sold
the farm, before he left, to his son, and he used a lot of money from the proceeds—he bought
supplies for schools. If he couldn’t get them, he’d just say, ‘Well, then I’ll get them.’ And he did
things for people, and I think the respect came from that, too, because he was so willing to do what
he could to help them.

(38:30) TW: Well, for example, he’d go down to the American Women’s Club in Vientiane, and
he’d tell them the plight of the schools, and ‘Here we have this little bamboo schools, and we need
pencils and we need notebooks and we need all sorts of things like this,’ and they’d come up and
take a collection or do a bazaar or whatever, and then come up and present them, and the local
people would just go crazy. You know, here’s the Ambassador’s wife handing over these donations
and things like that. Well this was all stuff that Pop would initiate, and he was always getting—
people were sending balloons and candy and pencils from the States, and he was handing them out
to the school kids, and he just really loved all this sort of thing. But he had a real touch with the
people—but there was a lot of jealousy among the American officials—
CM: [Sign of agreement]
TW: —in Vientiane about him, because here’s this uneducated—I say that in a respectful way; you
know, no higher education as far as I know, and certainly in the way he spoke was [Pauses] you
know, not very good grammar a lot of the time. The people at Vientiane, a lot of the officials
thought that he was a clown, and they were jealous of him, because he got—he got a lot of respect,
he got kudos from the most important people in the country, whether it’s the Ambassador or the
AID director. Even the King came—the King of Laos came to Sam Thong in 1963 [Pauses] and I’ll
try to dig up some photos of that occasion for you at some point. I couldn’t find them [All laugh]
this morning, but at any rate—and this was not only in respect to Pop, but the fact that here is a
Hmong village, and the King was trying to show that he was king of all the people and not just the
Lao people, ‘cause in the past, the Laotians had thought the Hmong were second-class citizens. No
question about it. And he was trying to show that he was king of the entire country. So—
(40:55) PW: The King came when we were there, too.
CM: Yeah, he did.
PW: So that’s at least twice.
CM: Dee and I met him. I had—
TW: So anyway, he [Pop] was a very complicated man. He had some enemies who didn’t like him
for one thing or another, but—
(41:14) CM: But part of it came, too—he ran a very successful refugee program. So people—when
you had Congressional visitors coming in, people would say, ‘Well, let’s take him up, and we’ll show
him Pop Buell’s program in Sam Thong,’ so he met a lot of Congressmen who kind of liked his
down-to-earth talk—you know, ‘You’ve got to bypass all this, you’ve got to look and we’ll do it this
way, and this is’—so that it got to the point where if they were stymied, he’d say, ‘I’ll write to Jack
Teague,’ who was a congressman from Texas, wasn't he?
TW: ‘Tiger Teague.’ He was head of, I think, the Armed Forces Committee, I believe, but at any
rate he was a committee chairman. ‘Tiger’ Teague, right.
CM: But he knew a lot of Congressmen, because they sent them up, and the Congressmen were
impressed.

PW: And he had Hollywood contacts where he got lots of money and donations—
CM: He did.
PW: —and the National Geographic article on him got him even more contacts, so yes, he was a
special person. There aren’t many people like Pop.
TW: Yeah.
CM: There are not.
PW: There are very few places in the developing world where an outsider can go in and have the
kind of impact that Pop had with the Hmong. He was accepted and trusted by the Hmong.
TW: And I don’t know that he could have had that same effect if he was working—if this was a Lao
village, because they have a different kind of culture, and his way, his nature—I’m sure he got along
well with the Lao, but on the other hand, he was tailor-made for the Hmong in his rapport.
PW: Among other things, he was a farmer; they were farmers. He always played that up as well,
even though he didn’t know a hill of beans about most Hmong agriculture. But he did know corn,
and they grew corn.
TW: And they drank corn, and he drank corn… [Loud guffaws]
PW: Exactly! That’s right.
(43:32) [Joking] I wondered when we were going to get to that!
CM: Oh, dear. But as you can see, you’re among a group who liked Pop. [Laughs] You’ll get with
other groups who may have different things to say about him.
I don’t think I’ve spoken to anyone who didn’t like him. I may have spoken to a few who
thought maybe he was more of a ‘big picture’ person or someone who liked to get down in
the mud with the people, but who didn’t necessarily mind the details of the operations as
efficiently as he could have. I think that’s the only criticism that I’ve heard.
PW: I don’t think he had to take care of operations. He had a lot of people, American and Hmong,
who were really good on the operational side of things. They made things work under Pop’s
command. [CM and TW agree] But, I do think that he paid careful attention to operations. People
didn’t independently go off and do things up there. Pop was in control and he knew what was going
on. People didn’t act on their own, even on the details.
CM: No.
(44:28) PW: You did things based on Pop telling you what to do. The Sam Thong operation was
as good an operation as it could possibly be, and it was because you had a lot of really dedicated
people working on it, and you had the leadership at the top. Leadership that would guide you, and
that would support you as well.

CM: Right.
PW: —no matter what you did, Pop would support you. I remember once we had a program
where we bought rice in areas that were producing rice, and then we’d distribute it to neighboring
areas where there were refugees. You’d get these huge bags of kip [Lao currency] and a set of scales.
You’d put your money bag and scales on the Porter aircraft, fly into an area and land, and everybody
would bring their rice. You’d weigh it and pay them right out of that bag full of money. I was on a
strip one day, my scales were out there on the air strip as well, as was my bag heaping full of kip. A
couple of enemy mortar rounds hit near the airstrip. I jumped into the plane and we got out of
there in a hurry. As we were circling out of there I looked down saw my bag of kip down there on
the airstrip! [All laugh]
I thought, ‘My god’—I didn’t know how much it was; perhaps it was only a few hundred dollars, or
maybe a thousand dollars, but my only thought was ‘My god, what am I going to do?’ I knew in my
heart that if I went back to Pop and said I had to leave that money on the strip, there would have
been no question about it.
But I didn’t have to do that. We circled around and circled around, eventually we went back in. I
jumped out, got the scales, and threw the money bag into the airplane. No one had touched it. But,
the point of the story is that I had absolute faith that Pop would have supported me on that. He
would not have questioned my motives—it wouldn’t have passed his mind that there was something
else going on. He was that kind of person.
(46:04) TW: You’ve got to remember, this was an emergency operation, and the people back in
AID Washington who wanted reports and wanted statistics and wanted accounting for every nickel,
they weren’t going to get it—
PW: Yes.
TW: —because this was a [Pauses] these people needed things in a hurry, and he had the authority
to get things in a hurry. If he couldn’t get it, some other agency would get it for him. And I
remember—we were talking about refugee supplies, and he sent—they needed, for example—he
wanted fish to develop fish ponds up there. Well, he sent me to Bangkok to the Agricultural
University, and I brought back a bunch of fish for the fish ponds. He needed—they wanted to raise
pork up there, because that’s a big mainstay of their diet. Well, we got these pigs, huge pigs flown in
from—hogs flown in from South Vietnam. I mean, these are things that he could get if he—if he
needed them, he could get them right away, you know? And the people would say, ‘Well, we
noticed on your last report, you didn’t account for this or that.’ Well, in that kind of situation, there
wasn't a real close accounting. But you know, the government wasn't wasting money, in my
opinion. I think the government—resources were going where they were really needed, and right
away, too.
(47:45) PW: But you couldn’t survive in today’s atmosphere. The kind of accountability that is
required these days. When I started working in Sam Thong, I had no idea, for instance, that there
was an eight-hour work day or lunch breaks, [CM chuckles] and that there were Saturdays and
Sundays off, and annual leave and home leave, and R&R. [TW chuckles] Whatever the job was, you
did it, seven days a week.

TW: That’s exactly—
PW: So— [Chuckles]
TW: Yeah, exactly right. You know, you’d work from sun-up to sundown.
CM: Right.
TW: You’d get up when the sun came up, and you’d go to sleep when it got—soon after it was
dark, ‘cause there was no elec—when I got there, there was no electricity there.
CM: Well, and we had a generator that had to be turned off.
TW: If you wanted—well, we had a generator, but that was only to run the—
CM: Hospital.
TW: —single side band, which was our only communication with Vientiane—no telephones, no emails, none of this whatsoever. If you wanted to cook something, we had a little private stove that
we would use to heat something, or we’d eat with the Hmong in the village.
PW: Yes.
TW: If you wanted to read, there was candle light, and that was it. [CM chuckles] So these were
not luxurious situations.
(49:16) CM: We had rats. [PW chuckles] I remember the big rats, because we lived by—by the
time we got there, they had built a Quonset hut. But it was the same thing: we had our office; our
living quarters were upstairs, with three bedrooms. I had one, because I was always there, until they
built me a house. But right next door was the rice warehouse. We had the biggest, fattest rats [All
laugh] you’ve ever seen in your life! They used to run up the girders by the bed, across the top, into
the rice warehouse. Those I’ll always remember.
TW: Well I can tell you an even better story about that. [All chuckle] Before the Quonset hut,
when we had the grass shack, we had a parachute strung up under the rafters, and the parachute was
there to catch the rats [CM groans] because the rats were running across [Pauses]
CM: Right.
TW: you know, the rafters, and they’d fall off every now and then [Chuckling, groaning] and the
parachute would catch them, and they'd just kind of slide down. They wouldn’t fall on our bed.
[Interviewer laughs] And I remember [Chuckles] you know, we’d have flowers growing under our
bed, because—just plants were coming up. [All laugh] A woman—a refuge relief person’s wife
came up with him one time, and she said, ‘Well, what a beautiful’—you know, ‘daisy,’ or whatever it
was. I said, ‘Where?’ and she said, ‘Under your bed.’ [All laugh]

(50:55) CM: Back to something serious: the one thing that I learned from Pop that stayed with me
my entire career—and after ten years with AID, I switched to State—was that we were the US
Government. Pop didn’t believe that ‘this was a USAID plane, that was an Agency [CIA] plane,’
and you couldn’t mix the two. [TW and PW agree] Pop said, ‘The people don’t care whether it’s an
Agency plane or whether it’s a USAID plane. All they know is they have somebody who’s sick and
needs to get to the hospital, and we’re the US Government, we’re not agencies.’ And that just stuck
forever—that you have to cooperate, that we are the US Government and we all have to work
together. And he did that. He created this cohesiveness between the different groups that were
working in that area. I don’t know—
TW: This is a very rare occasion where this worked, but there was a total US Government effort
when I was at Sam Thong, and everybody was working together. No matter who you worked for,
you were working—the idea was you were working for the US Government, and everybody was
doing their part. The different agency rivalries, or divisions within USAID about which office did
this or which office did that and crossing the line and all of that—there was none of that. [It was] a
total US Government effort, and I think that's one reason that the operation was so successful.
(52:43) PW: I agree. I learned something there that was pretty striking to me when I started going
out in the countryside to work with refugees. We were picking refugees up in conflict areas and
moving them to safe areas, giving them food and medical care, trying to start a school again,
building a new clinic and equipping it, giving them animals, agricultural tools and seeds, and other
support.
One day Pop sent me out to work with the Lao Theung instead of the Hmong. He said, ‘There’s a
guy that I really like; he’s one of the best people up in this area. He doesn’t get a lot of attention
because he’s not a Hmong. His name is Xieng Man Noi.’ Pop said, ‘I want you to go over there
and just spend some time in the village, get to know Xieng Man Noi and start to develop a
relationship with him.’
So I flew and then walked into his village area three or four times, spending a night or two or three
on each visit. [Chuckling] One evening around the fire (because there really wasn't anything to do
once it got dark except sit around the fire), Xieng Man Noi said to me, ‘You know, it’s interesting.
You’re always asking about the history of the Lao Theung and about our culture, where we came
from and what our relationship is to the Hmong and to the Lao, and other things like that.’
He went on to say, ‘When the Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese come into our villages, they talk
about the future, and what’s going to happen when this area is free of Americans and free of
foreigners - what’s going to happen in the new world that is coming. They say that is what they are
fighting for – a new world in the future. You talk about the past.
That conversation stuck with me, and on the plane going back to Sam Thong, I realized that my job
was not just to get rice out, to provide agricultural supplies, and medicine, there was a much bigger
picture that wasn't part of my thinking at all. I was not there for a political purpose, I was not there
to fight a war, or to convince anyone of the rightness of my world as opposed to some other world.
I was there to help people.
But from that day on, I looked more at the bigger picture. The small picture was where I was at but
I finally realized that my smaller picture fit into a larger picture, and that the larger picture perhaps

fit into even larger pictures. I really learned something from Xieng Man Noi around that fire on that
night in a Lao Theung village.
That revealed knowledge stayed with me for the rest of my career. Humanitarian assistance and
economic cooperation and development programs are real and the motivation for doing them is real
among development workers. But I learned that there is a larger sense of purpose that shouldn’t be
ignored. There was a sense of dedication and commitment to the people we were working with –
Hmong and to a lesser extent, to the Lao Theung, the Yao, and many other ethnic groups. We were
there for the future, not for the past or the present. That was a lesson well learned.
We were there not just to help people live another day and eke out an existence, we were not there
just to help the Hmong secure their homeland and live in peace and security, we were part of a
much larger and more complicated chess game and we were only one small pawn on the chess
board. My fireside chats perhaps did not change much, but my thinking became far more expansive.
(55:41) Well, you’ve gone a good ways down a road that I was going to take you to anyway,
so just in case there are some supplemental thoughts that might go along with that…
[Interviewer adjusts a recorder] Obviously there was this other relationship. You weren't
just there doing humanitarian work, you were there also in support of a war effort. It sounds
like you all believe that whether it was USAID or the CIA or Air America or Continental Air
or Bird and Sons or somebody out of the Ambassador’s office, it really didn’t matter—that
you were in it together. But did it in any way complicate your work to have all of these
agencies operating in the same place, or was it just as ideal and as seamless as you already
seem to have described it?
PW: For me it was pretty seamless. I knew what the guys at Long Tieng were doing, and I knew
how I fit into that. Certainly when you’re moving, supporting refugees, those refugees are also
military dependents, and so there was—clearly there was a strong relationship. But it was pretty
seamless, because everybody talked to each other. [CM & TW agree]
If something was happening somewhere, Pop would send us out on operation. That, I am sure, was
discussed with Long Tieng, with the other agency, with Vang Pao—there was a lot of
communication. In my opinion, it was pretty seamless.
(57:07) TW: And that was my opinion, too. I was there earlier than Paul, and I think we agree that
it was a pretty seamless operation. I think where it got difficult—and I was gone by then—was later
on, particularly when the military came in. And the military, in my opinion [Pauses] the air campaign
and all that sort of thing, that really complicated things [PW agrees] and it kind of—the smooth
effort, the combined effort that had been going on before, this kind of overtook everything—in my
opinion, anyway. And that’s when things got—well, in some respects it may have been necessary
due to the situation, I don’t know, but it seemed to me that when the American presence got much
bigger, that’s when things got more difficult.
PW: When things were really difficult, when they started falling apart, and the North Vietnamese
and Pathet Lao started to make major advances, when they were fighting for places like Phou Pha
Thi, Lima Site 85, and it was clear that if air strikes were authorized against the enemy there, perhaps
valiant Hmong soldier lives would have been spared.

Again, that forced you to look at a bigger picture as, ‘Why aren’t we providing all of the support that
we can to help these guys win? Why aren’t we?’ I remember, at one point [Pauses] the Hmong took
an offensive military action, attacking and taking enemy outposts and positions. The instructions
came from Vientiane that the rules of engagement were for a holding action and that offensive
actions were not authorized. The Hmong were asked to retreat. ‘How could that be?’ The Hmong
resisted but without support eventually had to withdraw. Without rice and other necessities, they
couldn’t last long.
About that time I fell ill with cerebral malaria. After several hospitalizations, the Embassy doctor
said to me, ‘If you don’t get out of Military Region II, you’ll undoubtedly come to this hospital
again, perhaps in a body bag. So I was moved to Luang Prabang. That is why I wasn’t around for
the post-Sam Thong era.
(59:31) What year did you make that move?
Sixty— [Pauses] I’ll have to think about it. [Pauses] It was in the early 70’s that I went to Luang
Prabang.
So this campaign would have been after Nam Bac, probably the one where VP re-took the
PDJ?
[Those present try to remember when it might have been]
PW: Basically, what happened was that the enemy pushed people out of Sam Neua, and they just
kept coming further and further south. We would resettle a group one year, and in the next dry
season offensive, the enemy would hit them again and we would move them further south.
Eventually the enemy was in range of Sam Thong and Long Tieng. When Sam Thong fell, the
operation was moved to Lima Site 272, just above the Vientiane Plain.
(1:00:18) CM: We went to 272 in 1970.
Ban Xoun?
PW: 1970—Ban Xoun, ’70.
TW: So [Nam Bac] was before that.
It must have been ’68 or ’69.
TW: Sixty-eight or ’69. ‘Cause I was in Luang Prabang [Pauses] just prior to that, I guess—prior to
your [Paul White] being there, and so yeah, I guess that’s about right.
(1:00:43) Well Tom, if you don’t mind, let’s focus on the very early years. You were, of the
three folks in this room (since I was not there at all) the person with the—you were there on
the earliest part of the mission. Could you just talk about some of the responsibilities that
you had and how you saw the operation working and interfacing with people and
organizations at that time?
TW: Well, you’ve got to remember that—I think October, there was the Geneva Accords—
October of ’62, which meant that all Vietnamese troops and American forces, which was a Special
Forces called White Star (maybe White Star was earlier, but at any rate), they were to leave the
country at that point, and the American forces did. The Vietnamese never did move an inch, and
they had troops in Sam Neua province, and on the Plain of Jars in Xieng Khouang. And so the

decision was made to [Pauses] you know, for the US to start to support the Hmong who had been
displaced earlier on. And Pop was there to distribute refugee supplies and that sort of thing. And
there’d been at least one person who’d gone up earlier, probably in late ’62, to work with Pop. And
he didn’t last. I think he had some medical problems and had to go. It wasn’t really clear. At any
rate, I arrived in February at Vientiane, went up to Sam Thong I guess in March of ’63. And as I
say, it was a very small operation. It was just Pop and me, and then maybe six months later another
fellow named Blaine Jensen came up. And [Pauses] the number of sites where we worked were
fairly limited. There was the area west of the Plain of Jars and south—primarily south and west of
the Plain of Jars, and there were one or two sites north of the Plain of Jars, but those were very, very
questionable territories. And so we didn’t get in there very often. But we were providing rice,
agricultural supplies like seed for planting—for the refugees that had been relocated—seed for them.
This was swidden agriculture, as you know—rice seed, we were providing iron bars. The Hmong
make their own machetes, and we would give them iron bars and they would make their own
machetes—this is to chop down bamboo trees and to build their structures and that sort of thing.
We provided medical supplies. Shortly after I got up there, Dr. Charles Weldon arrived, and he
started what was called the Village Health Program. And this was primarily in North Laos, and since
we were working primarily with the Hmong, we were providing medical supplies to all of these
different villages. And this was for malaria, for first aid, for all sorts of injuries. We later built small
dispensaries at different locations to treat more serious problems and eventually built a hospital at
Sam Thong. It was a bamboo hospital at first, and later as things got—we got more and more
support, we built a wooden hospital and brought in medical equipment and medical auxiliaries—a
couple doctors and—which had been furnished by Operation Brotherhood at first, and then we had
a Lao doctor and—so this—things just got bigger and bigger during those early days, but it was
quite limited again. [Pauses]
(1:05:48) Dr. Khammoun?
PW: Dr. Khammoun was the—
CM: Yeah, he came later, and—
PW: —Lao doctor
CM: —had studied in France. He had a house next to mine.
TW: But at first we had—we just had a medic. We had a fellow named Naimu Chan. Chan was a
[Pauses] was Lao and he’d been trained in Phnom Penh, so he would be [Pauses] I don’t know if
you could call him a [Pauses] I’d call him a paramedic, really, not a doctor’s assistant or anything like
that. He didn’t have that kind of training. But he had a good common sense, and he was the first
medical person and only medical person we had in Sam Thong in the early days. Dr. Khammoun
came on later.
CM: And you’ve talked with Dr. Westermeyer?
No. He’s on my list, though. He’s in the Twin Cities area, right?
PW: Right.
CM: Yeah.

TW: He was at the University of Minnesota Medical School.
(1:16:58) I did—actually just yesterday morning, talk to George Latimer, who was mayor of
St. Paul from ’76 to ’90, and a woman named Jane Kretzmann who was part of Lutheran
Social Services and then the Bush Foundation, so they gave me his contact information.
TW: Well he was Dr. Weldon’s assistant early on, fairly early. I guess maybe ’65 or something like
that.
CM: Yeah, that’s when we were there.
I also just a couple of weeks ago spoke to Choua Thao, who’s still out there getting it done.
CM: Oh, really? How great!
(1:07:37) In these early days—maybe it was still the case later, too, so please jump in if it
applies. Did you see much of military personnel in Sam Thong, other than just briefly
popping back and forth or did they stay—
TW: They stayed away—
CM: Yeah.
TW: —when I was there in ’63, ’64. I do remember one plane came in with an SGU unit and—but
that was rare. All the military stuff sat there in Long Tieng.
PW: We saw people later. We had a military attaché who was based in Sam Thong—several in
succession. They were unusual people. I remember the one guy—I don’t know if I should even
mention his name. [Interviewer chuckles] Captain Scroggins, I think, was his name. He was a huge,
huge, guy [Carol Mills makes a sound of recognition]—you know, six foot six and probably 250, 300
pounds—a really big military guy.
At one point—I recall that on our land-to-air radios that you used to talk to planes—you know, line
of sight communication—were broadcasting Vietnamese voices. That meant that they were really
close, and people were really worried. I remember that Captain Scroggins was so afraid that he
wouldn’t stay in his house. He wanted to come and stay with someone else in case there was an
attack.
So not all of these guys were battle-tested. I’m not sure what the military attaché did. Do you know
what those guys would—on a daily basis what they were doing? [Silence] But there was one in Sam
Thong for a while. Now where you saw them was at Muong Soui, which was close to the Plain of
Jars. That wasn’t a refugee operation, it was a Neutralist base.
When you flew into Muong Soui for some reason, you would occasionally see Americans there of
different stripes, sometimes Air Force people, sometimes Army people, but not a lot. There weren’t
a lot of Americans running around that area. There were a few places like Phou Pha Ti, but there
were only a few places in Northern Laos that I’m aware of where there was an American presence.
TW: And that was later on, too.

PW: Yes, much later on.
CM: Yeah.
TW: Not in the early ‘60s.
PW: No, no, no.
(1:10:12) More like 1968.
CM: Yeah, after I left, because they only came back and forth. When I left the military attaché
came to visit.
(1:10:24) Well one other American, obviously not military, but I think another person who
looms large is Father Bouchard.
PW: Hmm.
CM: Oh, of course.
How would you describe his work and how it matched up—or didn’t—with what you were
trying to accomplish, and the ways in which you managed to coordinate your efforts.
PW: I think we heard a lot from Father Bouchard about
what was happening out in the areas that he traveled to and
what people were thinking about. And occasionally—I
remember once going with Father Bouchard to Ban Na, Lima
Site 15—the place that he [Tom Ward] talked about earlier.
We were attacked that night. There were mortars coming in,
and Father Bouchard and I were whisked out on the trail by
the villagers. That was exciting, [Chuckles, others do, too]
really exciting stuff!
The other thing in my memory about Father Bouchard was
that I went out with him once to his leper colony. My hobby
is magic, and Father Bouchard said, ‘You know, my lepers
never get much entertainment. Father used to take movies to
show them but that was about it.

Father Lucien Bouchard

How’d you like to go to the leper village and do a magic
show?’ So I did. I went out with Father Bouchard to his leper village. I saw him perform a service,
and that was the first time that I saw what he carried in his knapsack. He put his knapsack down,
they had made a little table for him, he took out a robe robes and prayer beads - this was a Father
Bouchard I had never seen before!

He did his service and then I did the magic show. As I performed my first trick, everybody ran into
the forest and hid! [All laugh] Father Bouchard had to track them down and convince them to
come back! It was bad enough that you have this black person come to your village, but to have
him do magic as well!
I used to fly to fly to a Lao few village, ‘cause we worked with a few Lao villages, especially the
Muong Him area. I went to this Lao village, and as I walked through the village I would hear them
saying, ‘Marok! Marok!’ and they’d all go running. They’d grab their kids and put them into the
house! Marok! Marok!’
I finally learned that when the French were in Laos they had Moroccan soldiers with them. The way
that the women would tell their kids not to do something was to say, ‘If you don’t quit doing that,
the Moroccans are going to cut your head off with their sword!’
So, when they saw me, that’s what they thought! Marok! Marok! Marok!’ People were flying around!
That is what it was like in Father Bouchard’s leper colony as well. They all just disappeared into the
forest, but Father Bouchard eventually coaxed them all out to see the show.
Father Bouchard once told me that perhaps in all the years that he worked in Laos that he had had
made only two or three real converts.
(1:13:25) TW: He was a wonderful humanitarian, and he was an amazing specimen. He wasn’t a
big man, though he was a muscular man, but he would walk those hills just like the Hmong. And
they’d drop him off at one village and then—well, first thing you have to realize about him, he
would steal airplanes. [All laugh] He would coax us to send him somewhere where he wanted to
go, where he needed to go, and he would fly into a place, and then he said, ‘Well, would you pick me
up five days later at such and such a place?’ And he'd walk from that village over to another village
and see his people on the way. And I can remember some instances where the person he told—this
is after my time, of course, at Sam Thong, to pick him up. They forgot to pick him up, and he was
someplace—or they went on leave; I guess that was it, went to Bangkok. And Father Bouchard
didn’t get picked up for ten days or two weeks. [All chuckle]
PW: That’s probably why he worked out deals with the pilots. Every once in a while you were with
a pilot and you were supposed to be going somewhere. The pilot would say, ‘But we have to go
over here for a just little while. I have to pick up Father Bouchard.’ [All laugh] And that wasn't on
any flight plan that you had developed as a customer!
TW: That’s right.
PW: But yes, people took care of him as best they could. But there was not only Father Bouchard,
there were also Protestant missionaries that worked the area. There was a guy named Don Scott. I
really liked Don because of all the people I knew, he spoke the best Lao. We had some really good
Lao speakers, Win McKeithen, for example, but—Don Scott was a tremendous Lao speaker.
CM: Yes.
PW: And then there was the other Father, Father Jerry. He worked the Luang Prabang area.

TW: The—there was a missionary, an elderly missionary in Luang Prabang, back in the early ‘60s,
named Rolfe, [spells the name] who was a linguist. And he’d been there since the ‘20s I guess, and
he’d written a two-volume Lao dictionary. And he was—you know, and a lot of Protestant
missionaries, that’s one reason that they spoke such good Lao was that they’d studied, and studied
with him, maybe. But he worked primarily with the Lao rather than the Hmong.
(1:16:11) CM: And they were all Christian Missionary Alliance, the missionaries—Protestants.
TW: You know, there was also kind of a—as I recall, Father Bouchard was trying out—there was a
written—you know, originally there was no written Hmong language, and they were trying to
Romanize it, I guess, and I don’t—I’m not sure how that worked out, but…
(1:16:39) Oh yeah, Vint Lawrence talked about that, that there literally—there was a
competition between various missionary elements over which form of the language should
be used, and he said he had to sort of draw a line [Paul White laughs] and said ‘North of the
line you use this, and south, you use this’, so…
PW: But it didn’t really catch on anywhere. [Interviewer laughs] People were—
TW: I don’t think so.
PW: The Summer Institute of Linguistics has tried that in a lot of places, and it’s really hard to get
going, unless you have a stable environment. Laos just wasn’t stable enough. But you know,
speaking of Father Bouchard and all that, I guess the other thing that you might know about—
TW: A picture. Show him the picture.
PW: Yes, Pop did a lot of consultation with the missionaries so there’s the person in Vientiane—
what was his name? Father…
TW: Sibra?
PW: Yeah, maybe. Pop did a lot of discussion with missionaries, and consultations on things.
TW: But—and I don’t want to give the impression—or we don’t want to give the impression that
Bouchard was an intelligence agent, because he was not.
CM: He wasn’t.
TW: He didn’t go out to places to secure intelligence, but after he'd been in a village for a week, and
he'd come back and he’d tell us what the villages were telling him about the situation there, but that
was—you know.
(1:18:06) Yeah, it wasn’t official.
TW: No
CM: No

PW: Yeah, it was—
CM: And he certainly never coordinated and said—never, ever, you know, but he helped us out.
Well, it made sense to take advantage of what he knew.
All: Yes.
TW: We were helping him and he was helping us, that’s about it.
PW: But on the religious side, there was also the person that Tom mentioned - Tong Saar. Tong
Saar was Buddhist. In fact, he liked to be called Maha Tong Saar, which meant that he had reached
a certain level of Buddhist study. I forget what happened to Tong Saar. He fell out of a tree and—
CM: Fell out of a tree and…
PW: —died from the fall.
CM: Yeah.
PW: But he was there when I first got to Sam Thong. It was my impression of Tong Saar was that
he was a very religious person, a Buddhist and a spin doctor. He was the kind of person that Pop
would normally never tolerate on the Western side, but Pop respected Tong Saar—I guess Tong
Saar had really good contacts and talked to people, but he was also pretty screwy in a religious way.
He was not the kind of person that fit the mold of most Hmong or anyone else in Sam Thong. He
was really different.
TW: He was kind of a blend between—he was Buddhist, but he was also—he could understand the
spirits—the Hmong spirits as well, and he’d kind of mix them together, and he could—that’s one
way he could believe when they would tell him that something happened because of some event, he
could understand that and deal with it. So he was a valuable guy, made a real contribution early on.
(1:20:02) Well Paul, you were talking earlier about your education experience, and while it
wasn't necessarily what you’d signed up for originally, that you really grew to love it. What
was that program, and how did it accomplish its goals—or maybe not quite accomplish
them, and why did you love it so much?
PW: Yes. Well, the program was whatever I wanted it to be, [Interviewer laughs] because I was just
put into a school in Sam Thong without orders - and that was it. I didn’t receive any instructions,
So I started by teaching English, and very quickly I saw that the school system, even in Sam Thong,
required a lot of attention. The desks were hacked from timbers with machetes. They were terribly
rough and crude. I talked to Vientiane. I said, ‘I want to start a program to upgrade the Hmong
schools in Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua. What I need are a hundred sheets of plywood. I’ll first
teach the teachers mechanical drawing and use that knowledge to design the desks and chairs. Then
we’ll make them.

I was working at the Xieng Khouang teacher training institute – the only teachers training school in
Xieng Khouang. My plan was to teach all of the teachers how to make desks and chairs using
plywood by first integrating mathematics, measurement and mechanical drawing, and then getting to
draw out a plan, and eventually to learn to use saws, hammers and nails to cut out the plywood and
put the desks and chairs together.
That is what I did. Every graduating teacher, when they left the institute, received enough supplies
to make all of their desks and chairs for their rural schools. That was exciting stuff, and Pop really
supported me in moving that program forward. Pop liked that program.
We then started a program of school infrastructure upgrading. Teachers were taught how to replace
the really crude tin roofs and hand-cut timbers with commercial tin roofing sheets and saw-cut
wood to make better looking, safer and more secure schools. Pop allowed me to use some—I don’t
know what they were there for - Thai carpenters. I guess they were there to build your house
[talking to Carol Mills, she chuckles].

School construction
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CM: That could be!
TW: They built the hospital, yeah.
PW: —and then they built the hospital.
CM: They built the hospital
PW: Yes. And there was a guy named Praneet who was a Thai guy who managed all these
carpenters. Pop assigned a couple of them to me at the school to help teach how to really upgrade
school buildings. So we got a new program going. We upgraded a number of schools, starting with
Ban Na.
That is essentially what I did. Plus I worked on the sports stuff that I talked about earlier. We did a
lot with sports – high jump, broad jump, javelin throw, shotput, 100- and 200-yard dashes, hurdles,
basketball and soccer.

When the American refugee officer was killed at Na Khang, Don Sjostrom, Pop said, ‘We really
want to do something for Don’ Don had also worked at the school before he went up to work at
the airstrip, so Pop said, ‘I want to do something at the school as a memorial to Don. What do you
think should be done?’
I talked to people for a while, and finally told Pop, ‘I think we need to build a library at the school—
have the first library in Hmong-dom.’ Pop said, ‘But people don’t read. Why would you want a
library?’ I said, ‘All of those school kids read. And the only thing they have to read is one Lao
primer. So we should make a lot of books available to them.’ And besides that, I said, ‘Pop, you
don’t know it, but I’ve been doing an adult education class.
I’m sure Tom has had this experience: every time I went out to a village somewhere, people would
have letters that they had received from the Lao government—some official letter [Tom Ward
makes a sound of recognition]. No one could read in the village so they’d give it to me to read to
them. So I started a program using the daily newspaper from Vientiane that arrived a week or two
late to Sam Thong.
I set up bulletin boards and displayed the newspaper on the bulletin boards. I had school kids who
were literate stand by the bulletin board to read the newspaper to any adults who were interested.
Sometimes there were 15 or 20 adults standing there with a kid from school reading the newspaper
for them.
One day I said, ‘Pop, you ought to just go see.’ He drove over to the school and saw what was
going on. ‘OK,” he said, “build the library.’ ‘Pop, we need money to do that. He came up with
$2000—I’m not sure from where. ‘I will go to Bangkok and buy a lot of picture books, and if you
read Lao you can read Thai. It’s not a big jump. So I’ll stock the library with Thai books plus all of
the Lao books I can get from USIA, and English books as well. Everyone can donate books from
the States, especially picture books. So we built this library for Don Sjostrom. It was well
appreciated and well used. That was an exciting project.
TW: To my knowledge, this is the first time Hmong had ever been encouraged to read in Laos,
unless you’re in Vientiane and they brought some very VIP Hmong’s child to Vientiane to a Lao
school or a French school. I think this is the first time that ever happened. It’s a real breakthrough.
(1:25:00) PW: When I was in Washington with AID as the Director for Asia, I received a Hmong
delegation to my office. This younger Hmong came in with three or four really old Hmong. They
wanted to go back to Laos. They had been told to come to the State Department. AID was in the
State Department and the Hmong were sent to me. They should not have been talking to me as
AID but they were there.
They wanted to petition the US government to send them back to Laos because they were having so
many social problems. They said that they were old and just wanted to go home. Of course, I
couldn’t do anything for them. At the end of the meeting, I said to this young Hmong guy who was
the translator, ‘You really speak good English. Where did you learn your English?’ He said, ‘Well, I
was born in Sam Thong. When I was there, there was this black guy who used to ride around on a
little red motor scooter. He was my English teacher. [All laugh]

I said, ‘Well what was his name?’ He said, ‘We called him Tan Pohn.’ I said, ‘Tan Pohn. Did he
used to—and I described how I used to dress. Then I said, ‘That was me!’ [All laugh] And boy,
what a reunion we had!
I really enjoyed teaching sports as well. We held a Hmong Olympics at Sam Thong. When I went
out to do school upgrading, I tried to incorporate sports areas as well. I built a basketball court at
Ban Na, and in several other places. I also built broad jump and high jump areas as these did not
require much equipment or upkeep. But the Hmong hated the high jump with a bamboo pole
across it. If you put a loose string across, just barely draped, they loved it.
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The Hmong Olympics was incredible. I had to get Pop’s permission to bring kids in from four or
five different schools [Carol Mills laughs] from around Xieng Khouang Province. At first Pop
gruffed but then he approved it. He even drove over to the school for that event. So yes, those
were things made me feel that I was really helping expand Hmong horizons, helping them to move
into a different kind of society than the war that they saw around them, and the abject poverty of
swidden agriculture in a war-torn village. I was giving them something else to think about.
And [Pauses] So yes, I [Pauses] It was hard leaving the school to go over to the air strip. But the
refugee program was where all of the real excitement happened, so I gladly moved on. Yes, that
was the education program, mostly school construction and upgrading, and not a lot of teaching.
I happened to teach in the classroom right next to Phaytoune, who’s Ernie Kuhn’s wife. That was
[he and Carol chuckle] was good because she was a dedicated teacher, not like me – someone trying
to find ways to be useful.
The teacher training school was actually a really good school. The medics’ training program was
another good program. Pop brought Hmong kids in from everywhere. Someone made sure that
every major village had kids enrolled in the teacher training school learning how to be a batter
teacher and in the hospital learning how to be medics and nurses. That someone - the brains behind
those programs, was Chao Saykham, the governor of Xieng Khouang, and Moua Lia, who was the
head of education for Xieng Khouang—two tremendous guys.
Well, remind me to ask you a little bit more about them later.

PW: OK
(1:28:31) So Carol, working as Pop Buell’s secretary, I imagine, involved a more than typing
and dictation and organizational skills. What kinds of things were you up to, and also, what
was it like to be really the only woman in a position like this at this time? You alluded to
that a little bit already, but if there are other things you’d care to—
Well, it kind of involved everything secretarial and administrative. I mean, if the plumber needed
tools I had to order them, which I knew nothing about, either. I would call Vientiane and say, ‘I
need plumber tools.’ ‘Well what kind of tools?’ ‘Well whatever a plumber needs, send me.’
[Laughs] And the same thing—you know, the jeeps would break down, and it was up to me to
order parts. ‘Well, what’s the matter with the jeep? I didn’t even drive at that time! And I’d say, ‘I
don’t know, it just doesn’t run.’ Sometimes some of the guys would give me advice on what was
wrong, but what I would say is, ‘Send a mechanic with parts and get him to fix it.’ So I did all of
that. And then I was the single sideband [radio] operator, which you’d [to Tom Ward] probably
done before. You know, just somebody always by the radio if one of the guys called in from the
field, or Vientiane calling up, telling you things you should do. You could always say there was too
much static—‘I can’t hear you—send it by pouch!’ [All laugh] And then I ended up having a single
sideband radio in my bedroom at home so that we had 24 hour contact with whoever needed to call
us, or whoever we needed to call. I don’t know—it was interesting. I kind of did whatever came
up. Often Pop and all the guys would be out in the field, so I would be the only American there,
and the dispatchers would often say to me when they didn’t want to make the decision, ‘Should we
send the plane here or should we send the plane there?’ because they were all important people.
Then they would come to me and say, ‘You have to decide, because’—I mean, they would know
what should be done and that’s what they would do, but they didn’t want to be the one to tell the
local leader that he can’t go back right now, we have to go back and get the people who are
wounded or sick or whatever. So it was a lot of doing this: I baked a lot of cookies [Laughter] I
really did! And when I wasn’t busy, I baked. When I was in the office we had an old oven that did
not have a thermostat, but I would bake cookies and send to whoever was out in the field. When
the King came to [Sam Thong], I baked cookies for his meal there. In fact, I wrote down 2167 that
I actually served for the King’s lunch, because a lot burned when you can’t regulate the oven, and
you don’t check it all the time. But you know, you did whatever you were asked. I just remember it
was exciting, because it wasn’t anything I had ever done or would ever do again. But it was the
people that you worked with—we had wonderful people: the Hmong in the office, the
dispatchers…
PW: I remember Carol at the single sideband with a sheet of paper, because sometimes the talk was
in code. [Laughter]
CM: And actually, you know, when they really accepted me, that I could do the job as a female, is
when there was a problem at one of the sites—and I don’t even remember which one, but they
needed constant radio contact, and I would man the radio from six in the morning until midnight,
and I think they were amazed that a female could actually work that long. [Interviewer chuckles]
And that’s when everybody came to say, ‘OK, she’s one of the gang. She’s—
(1:33:26) Maybe Na Khang?
The naikongs?
TW: No, Na Khang.

PW: Na Khang, Lima Site 36.
“The Alamo”
CM: Oh, it could have been. Yeah, they were always having some—
PW: But I think there was a time in all of our lives when people accepted us as being part of Pop’s
team. There was always this period of trial before that happened.
CM: Right. I don’t ever remember being tested by Pop. Now maybe I was. The first time Dee
[Dick] and I went up to Sam Thong to visit, he had us stay in Tong Saar’s house, and maybe Tong
Saar was giving his opinion on the two of us! [Laughter] Though I’d worked with Tong Saar
before, because being in rural development in Vientiane, I typed a lot of his papers, and—you did
things for people who were upcountry and couldn’t do it for themselves.
(1:34:29) Well, could any or all of you talk about any contact or impressions you had of
Vang Pao or Chao Saykham or Touby Lyfoung—I don’t know if you had much or any
exposure to all of those men, but they all obviously were significant leaders in the Hmong
community at that time.
CM: I had a lot, of course, with General Vang Pao because he and Pop were so close. And of
course, I really admired him. I thought he was wonderful. But I was very naïve. I remember
listening to elections on the radio once with Jack Williamson, who was there at the time, and saying
to Jack, ‘Isn’t it wonderful? All of General Vang Pao’s people are winning!’ And Jack looked at me
and said, ‘Carol, who did you think would win?’ [Laughter] But I always admired him. And Chao
Saykham I thought was terrific. And we kind of had—I became very good friends with his wife. She
came to visit me when I lived in Thailand, in fact. And up there they would often just stop by the
house, and we would just sit and talk in my limited Lao [Laughs] and I spoke no French. He spoke
French fluently. But I remember him; he would often tease me about things. But he was very
informal—but then again, that may have been my relationship. Paul would have worked with him
more officially, as would have Tom.
TW: I didn’t work with Chao Saykham, but of course I knew Vang Pao, and I respected him. I
knew him—well, he was a major—a captain or a major when I first got there—maybe a major, or a
lieutenant colonel possibly, I’m not sure, but he jumped from lieutenant colonel to two-star general
[Laughter] real quickly.
CM: Yeah, that’s pretty good.
TW: But I guess he was still a colonel—I guess he was a colonel when I got there, but he was quite
a dynamic guy, and he was very—he was a very resourceful, dedicated fellow. And I think there
were rivals among the Hmong or the different clans, and each clan had a different leader, and they
were suspicious of each other. He did a good job, I think, of convincing the leadership to follow
him. Now there were some, maybe in Sayaboury province that were anticommunist, but still
opposed to Vang Pao, and of course Faydang [LoBliyao] was the leader of the Pathet Lao Hmong.
And the—as far as I was concerned, he was well-respected by the Hmong, and of course he was
quite ruthless, too—he could be. And he [Pauses] He was a pretty tough guy. And Touby Lyfoung

was not very well respected, as I recall. He was known as the King of the Meo, which they were
called at that time. He was a slick political-type person who got along well with the bureaucrats in
Vientiane, the military. He was known [Pauses] He was actually—it seemed to be internal—I didn’t
know him that well, but he seemed to be a charming guy. A bit corrupt, but I never really knew—
there was—seemed to be some friction between him and Vang Pao. I would think he would look at
Vang Pao as some young upstart, you know, who didn’t have the background, who didn’t have
fluent French, who hadn’t been to Paris—or maybe he had, but I didn’t know about it, but he had—
PW: Anyway, he was a tool of the Americans.
TW: And he was a tool of the Americans, and of course Touby could have been, and maybe he was
earlier, but I think Touby was the kind of guy that would go either way, you know?
PW: Yes!
TW: So, you know, I didn’t—there was—people would respect Touby, but he was not a real
loveable person [Interviewer laughs]—by the people that I was working with. You know, Pop got
along with him all right, but had some—I think Pop had some question about where Touby’s
loyalties really were.
(1:39:56) PW: I, of course, met General Vang Pao many times and worked with him., The one
thing I remember about him was a luncheon that we had at Long Tieng outdoors. I have a picture,
though I don’t have it with me. It was—Vang Pao sitting next to Father Bouchard, and Pop and I
were at that table as well. It was a time when something terrible was happening. It could have been
the fall of Na Khang or something else. What I remember was Vang Pao saying, ‘One day you guys
will walk and I will still be here.’ And that was not quite true, because he walked, too.
I met Touby Lyfoung one time when I was working in Luang Prabang. The crown prince came to a
small area just after you crossed the bridge where the Hmong lived. The crown prince came to visit
the Hmong at Hmong New Year and Touby Lyfoung came as well. I had something I wanted to
ask Touby Lyfoung. I approached him and started to tell him who I was. He said, ‘I know who you
are,’ and summarily dismissed me. His tone of voice was saying, ‘I know who you are, now get out
of my way.’ That was my only encounter with Touby Lyfoung. [Laughter]
So much for that.
PW: Yes. But I don’t know that I ever heard his name mentioned in any Hmong village anywhere I
ever was. He was…
Kind of yesterday’s news in a way?
PW: Certainly, he was not today’s news.
TW: He was—he seemed to be more popular or better known among the foreigners in Vientiane,
the French particularly, than the rural Hmong of the country.
(1:41:58) Yeah. Touby was the man who’d sort of committed to helping the French back at
the end of the Second World War.

TW: That’s right.
CM: Yeah.
So the French, I’m sure, regarded him more highly. Now what about Chao Saykham?
PW: Well I enjoyed Chao Saykham. He was a really good leader in a difficult situation. I mean, he
was the [Prince] of Xieng Khouang, but most of Xieng Khouang was not part of his empire
anymore as it was in enemy hands.
If you went to Chao Saykham to say, ‘We’re going to have a school dedication at Na Loueng.
Would you come?’ He would accept without hesitation. He was [Pauses] one of these guys who
was very educated on the French side and could easily go either way. But he was there in Sam
Thong—a lot but not all of the time. He didn’t have to be. He could have spent his time in
Vientiane going to social events —but he wasn’t. He was out leading in Xieng Khouang. I thought
he was tremendous. He was an absolutely amazing person.
CM: He’s the uncle of Ernie’s wife also.
Oh!
CM: So she’ll know a lot about him—and Ernie, too.
(1:43:20) Well, you [Tom Ward] mentioned Dr. Charles Weldon, and obviously another very
important part of the USAID effort was public health. And there are, I’m sure, a number of
ways in which we could describe how Dr. Weldon and USAID staff and a number of other
people improved the lives of many of the people of Laos. If any of you want to comment on
Doc Weldon, on USAID efforts, or maybe even prior to that, issues relating to public health
in the mountainous and lowland regions of Laos—what was it that was afflicting people,
what were the problems that you were addressing, and how were those problems mitigated?
TW: Well, you know, when I first got up there, they didn’t have any medical care as far as I could
see. I mean, there were no towns around, no roads where you could get to a hospital. I guess the
closest one would have been in Xieng Khouang, which was under the PL, Luang Prabang, or
Vientiane. And if you didn’t get on a plane, you—I mean, you just didn’t go to a hospital or a
medical clinic unless you were very—about to die, I guess. And a lot of people never got that
opportunity, anyway. So there just wasn’t any medical attention for many of these people—rural
people—until Dr. Weldon started his program. And fortunately, we had aircraft that could deliver
medical supplies. Dr. Weldon had trained medics, and he trained nurses for the hospital—or he
didn’t, but he set it up so they [did]—medical attention—there wasn’t—he built the hospital at Sam
Thong, and he brought [PB] on—the sickest people were brought into Sam Thong to the hospital
and treated. This was a service that just wasn’t available before, but he built a number of what he
used to call bamboo dispensaries in a number of these sites, like Ban Na and other—Phou Khoum
and [Pauses] Bouam Luong, places where there just weren’t any type of medical facilities at all. And
he would try to—he would have the medic go around and visit—these were local medics, but he
also had a couple of guys who were former Special Forces, like Steve Schofield, for example, and
[Pauses]

PW: Jim—
CM: Don Dugan.
PW: Don Dugan and Jim whatever his name was.
CM: Jim Thiel?
TW: These guys helped train the medics and they would also go around—and these were people
who provided a lot of support for the Hmong.
PW: [Holding a picture] This is how it was done by the medics.
Oh my.
PW: [Chuckles] They carried their own protection.
Wild.
CM: And Jiggs was a person like Pop who believed in
what he was doing and would fight to get it. I know one
time when I was up in Sam Thong, and a memo came out
from Vientiane. The budget was being cut, and
everybody had to cut back their programs because there
just wasn't money to be had. And both Pop and Jiggs
wrote memos that said ‘You cut back my program, I’m
resigning and going home.’ Pop and Jiggs got full
budgets. Nobody else had the courage to do that,
nobody else got full budget. And people were not happy
that they did, but Jiggs said, ‘If I can’t get the money to
do my job, then I’m not going to stay here. I don’t need
this job.’ He and his wife were both medical doctors.

Doc Weldon

TW: And Jiggs had a wife named Patricia McCreedy, who was also a physician, and she did a lot of
traveling, provided a lot of support for the medical—for the village health program. And Jiggs did
not just work upcountry, he worked in Vientiane, he got support for (***) hospital, he was the
American counterpart for Operation Brotherhood, the Filipino group that had a hospital in
Vientiane. And so the whole medical scene there was—he oversaw that, and also medical facilities
elsewhere in the country, in Pakse and other parts of the country, and he was, of course, counterpart
to the Minister of Health. So his attention was not just for the Hmong, it was also for the Lao.
PW: The big medical problems upcountry were malaria, dysentery, and gunshot wounds—those
were the three biggies, perhaps not in that order. If you’re going to talk to Dee Dick, she can brief
you on that.
Infant mortality to a lesser degree, I suppose?

PW: Yes, infant mortality was pretty high. I’m not sure that anyone kept track of it, but yes, things
were pretty primitive.
(1:49:17) Well, just in general terms I’m curious: even if you were stationed in [Sam
Thong], you must have traveled around a bit, even if it was just to go to Long Tieng or to an
outpost or to, to a dispensary, to a school. To the average uninformed person like myself,
you’ve alluded to the fact that this was not exactly transportation-friendly landscape. What
was it like to hop in a plane or a chopper or to wander through the jungles and sort of
wonder what might be on the other side of the hill in days like these?
TW: Well, it could be a little daunting, but this was our job, and we had to fly—you know, that was
the thing. Pop wasn't—‘No, you’re going to get on that plane and go there right now.’ [All laugh]
And you didn’t say, ‘Well, I’m going to think about it’ [Interviewer laughs] or ‘I have something else
to do.’ If you said that, he’d put you on the plane back to Vientiane and you wouldn’t be back up
country. You did it right away without hesitation, because you knew that if he asked you to do it, it
was something that was very necessary, and—but yeah, it could get—the main problem, I felt, about
flying up there—well, there were two problems. One problem was, of course, flying over enemy
territory and you’d get shot at. Well normally you didn’t do that, ‘cause you stayed out of the way.
But they had these sucker beacons where sometimes they would draw in aircraft. [Phone rings] At
any rate, that wasn't the main problem. The main problem was flying [Phone rings again]—this was
a mountainous area, and you’re flying in bad weather six months out of the year—you know, from
June to September you have the monsoon, and you can’t see where the hell you’re going.
PW: I’m showing him Lima Site 50 air strip.
TW: Yeah.
PW: And you can see right here, there’s a cliff on one
end and it’s a very short run before you reach the end
of the airstrip. So if you come in short, you’re crashing
into the cliff. If you land and reverse your propellers,
you’ll stop just before you crash into the mountain.
And that’s the way many of the air strips were.

Lima Site 50

(1:51:24) TW: And I had a crash there on that very site. It was—fortunately [Pauses] It broke the
strut or something, but it was—nobody got hurt, but it was a very—all of these—that’s another
thing I didn’t mention. All of these air strips were very, very short on the side of a hill—and some
were a lot shorter than others, and that—so the pilots were so skilled in most cases that they could
handle it, and it wasn't a problem. So I didn’t worry about the fact that you’re going into a real short
strip like that, but it was just getting from one place to the other. What bothered me was you
couldn’t see where you were going—going through the fog and the rain, et cetera. And I worked
with a guy [Pauses] named Phil DeCaro at Sam Thong when I first got there. He was actually from
across the hill, but they put him up at Sam Thong at first. But we were working seven days a week
and [Pauses] on refugee problems and getting on planes and taking medical supplies over here or
iron bars over there to make machetes and whatever, dispensing these refugee supplies. It was
Saturday, and it was my turn. We alternated going to Vientiane and it was my turn to go to
Vientiane for the weekend. And he said, ‘I’ve got a date in Vientiane in this weekend. Do you mind

switching with me?’ And I said, ‘No, I don’t mind.’ This was during the rainy season. So he got on
a Helio Courier, took off for Vientiane [Pauses] and never got there. The plane—they couldn’t find
their way, and so they were following the river down toward Vientiane, and couldn’t see a mountain
and crashed, and were like in the jungle for like three days, three or four days before they found
them. They were alive, but he and the pilot had some pretty serious burns. They put him on a plane
and sent him to the States, and he never came back. He resigned from the government. But that’s
what bothered me about flying up there. It was very dangerous. You know, you were in very good
hands, you had good pilots who knew exactly what they were doing, but even then, the weather
conditions sometimes were so bad that you never knew whether you were going to make it or not.
PW: I had two really interesting experiences on airplanes. One was at Lima Site 50. It was under
attack. Pop wanted to know exactly what was going on. The Hmong leader there was named Zoua
Pao, right?
CM: Zoua Pao, yeah.
PW: Pop said, ‘You’ve got to go find out what Zoua Pao needs.’ So I flew up there with the only
pilot available - a Porter pilot named Mississippi (Nickname) Howell. Mississippi was a guy I’d
never flown with because he wouldn’t fly with me. [Interviewer makes wary sound] Pop said to
him, ‘You’ve got to take Paul up to LS-50. We’ve got to know what’s going on.’ So I rode with
Mississippi Howell for the first time.
When we arrived at Lima Site 50 it was socked in. We circled and circled. Finally it opened up a
little bit and Mississippi turned to me and to say, ‘I’ll put you on the ground but I can’t stay on the
ground, because you can see they’re fighting. He pointed out mortar rounds exploding.’
Mississippi landed on that precarious airstrip in precarious weather with fighting going on in the
valley below. I jumped out as he spun his plane around and took off in a hurry. “I’ll wait for you up
above and within range of your ground-to-air radio,” he told me.
I went up the hill to the hut where Zoua Pao was and got all the information I could about the
situation at LS-50. The enemy were fighting hard but so were Vang Pao’s Hmong warriors. It was
Zoua Pao’s assessment that he would be able to “hold” the site.
When I got back to the airstrip, it was socked in again. I talked to Mississippi on the ground-to-air
radio. I couldn’t see the plane or even hear it but Mississippi came up on the radio. He said, ‘It is
socked in pretty bad right now but I’m not going to leave you here. My job was to get you here and
to get you back to Pop. I’ll do that’
Mississippi circled for a while but the airstrip remained covered in clouds. Finally he said, “Fuel is
low so I’m going to have to come in blind. I’ll make a pass, a safe pass, over where I think the strip
is and you tell me if I’m on the right alignment or not. [Others gasp] He made a high pass to clear
the mountain at the end of the strip and he was pretty well over the air strip. ‘OK., the next time
I’m coming in.’ He put his plane down on that airstrip with almost no visibility and extracted me
from a dangerous situation. Remember, this is a guy who for three years has never said a word to
me. If I walked into the mess hall in Sam Thong and he was sitting there, he would get up and walk
out. But this was work, this was a mission and he showed his true grit by putting aside his personal
feelings and doing what was right for our program and for our country.

That reveals a bit about how people felt about Pop. The other
time I was out with a pilot named Jim Betts, a Continental Air
pilot. We were going out to Lima Site 222, which was close to
the North Vietnamese border. The weather was not good and
Jim got lost. When we broke through the clouds at one point to
try to get our bearings, we looked down and saw a highway
[Laughter] – there were no highways in northern Laos.
‘We’re in the wrong place,’ Jim shouted. He put his plane into a
sharp upward bank and climbed as high as he could as quickly as
he could. We saw some red tracers in the sky. That was a sign
that rockets might soon be launched. Jim yelled into the radio,
“They’re going by burning hot and we are in deep ….
Kimchee.”

Jim Betts

We made it safely back to Lao territory but we were definitely flying over North Vietnam. Those
were the kinds of experiences we all had in that wonderful Kingdom of a Million Elephants and the
White Parasol. [Pauses]
I’m going to have to go, [looks for another photograph he wants to show] but these were the people
we were working with and for. This little refugee guy was holding onto everything he had in the
world. That’s what he took with him on the airplane. He symbolized what Sam Thong was all
about, and what our International Voluntary Services and USAID programs in northeast Laos were
all about, working with and for, helping, and learning from, and growing to love people like this.
Let me take a picture of you before you go, if you don’t mind, and in fact if you want, you
can hold that picture in front of you as well. Let’s get a shot of the three of you as well.

[Asks Mr. White if these photos are on line at the Hmong Cultural Center, he says yes, gives him the
web address. More discussion, photos of White and the trio taken. Recorder turned off. New track
begins with Ms. Mills and Mr. Ward.]
[Mr. Ward tells Interviewer he should read Douglas Blaufarb’s book.]
TW: You need to read that.
Yeah, I think I’ve got it on order.
TW: OK, you need to read that one, ‘cause he talks about [Pauses] it’s a book about working with
the Hmong. He was the Station Chief, you know.
Oh yes, right.
TW: And he was very disheartened by how [Pauses] he feels we let the Hmong down, and you
might—I’m sure you need to read that.
Yeah. I got that one. In fact, I just read Ted Shackley’s book, too, which ironically enough,
he dedicated to the Meo people.
CM: [Makes a sound of surprise.]
TW: Well, you know, we— is that [the recorder] off?
Well, let’s put it this way: nothing that gets on here gets beyond us until you see it. So this
is just for us.
CM: [Chuckles]
TW: Well, I would say that Ted Shackley was not well-loved by a lot of people in Laos. And it
seems to me a little ironic that he would dedicate his book to the Hmong people,
(1:03) Well nobody was more surprised than I when I read that.
Because [Pauses] well, Blaufarb by far was much more of a sympathizer for the Hmong people and
did things for the Hmong people. Leonard Unger before him and Bill Sullivan between Unger and
[Pauses]
And Godley.
Of course, you’re talking about two ambassadors now. Charlie Whitehurst, who was the original
station chief back in 1962—these were people who really were working with the Hmong people.
And they were getting their directions straight from the White House, and from [Pauses]
State Department.
State Department, right. And also—
CM: But you know, when we went to Roger Warner’s book signing, I remember Roger Warner
coming back in from having been outside saying the people from the Agency attacked him, because
they thought he was really unfair to Shackley in his book.
TW: Well some people may have.
CM: I don’t even remember—
TW: I know people that—that Shackley had a lot of detractors among Agency people as well.

(2:24) I haven’t spoken to anybody who’s—the only person who’s come close to speaking
well of him is Tom Clines, who was the ground ops guy later. And even he, I think, in
retrospect, has sort of come over to the idea that, ‘You know what? He may have been
ambitious and bright and hard-charging and all that, but he also just didn’t know what the
heck he was doing.’
TW: Right.
So trust me, if—
Read Weldon’s book later on when you get to Site 85. I think he’ll have some things to say about
him as well.
Yeah. I think I’m up to about 1967 right now.
(3:07) Were there stages, in your experience—and I know yours [Ward’s] started earlier and
ended earlier, but were there kind of stages in your experience where you went through
different thoughts, different feelings about the American effort and the impact it was having
on the country? Or would you say that you remained pretty consistently of one mind on
what you were doing and why you were doing it?
TW: I feel like when I was in Laos I was certainly pretty much of one mind. I worked ’63, ’64 and
’65 in Sam Thong, and then went on home leave, and when I came back I was transferred to Luang
Prabang. I was still working with refugees in Luang Prabang, but in some—some were Hmong, but
many of them were also Yao or Mien, as well as Lao. And yes, I felt that the effort was right, but I
felt that—I did not think that the heavy use of air power was the right way to go, because the
military more or less took over the situation, and you didn’t have that good, close relationship with
the different parties that we had back in the early ‘60s, and I thought that was a big mistake. And
again, in hindsight, maybe there wasn't any alternative. To me, that heavy-handed approach rather
limited counter-insurgency approach—the heavy-handed approach seemed the wrong thing to do to
me, as far as I was concerned.
CM: And I was always an optimist. I mean, I went to Laos, growing up in the Church of the
Brethren (we’re a pacifist church, and I was very much an anti-war pacifist), so what I saw was the
good we did, the helping the refugees. I did the monthly meetings for the rice drops where the
refugees had moved to, and how much rice they had, and I think I always looked at the good part of
what we saw, and was completely oblivious to a lot of the rest because I didn’t want to be involved
in war.
(5:51) That’s understandable.
CM: And then I left in ’67. I came back the end of ’69 to work one more year. Pop asked me if I
would come back, because I knew the people and the people knew me. And he said, ‘It’s a bad
time’ and it was. I went to Sam Thong and that’s when Sam Thong was overtaken and we moved to
Ban Xoun. But I made him promise he’d let me stay to the end, because earlier when they had
problems he would always evacuate me, and that always irritated me. [Chuckles] I kept saying, ‘Just
because I’m a female, you shouldn’t send me out,’ but he always did. So he agreed that he wouldn’t
that time, and he didn’t.
(6:47) Tom, during your early stint—and I realize some of this probably occurred after you
left—but Weldon does talk a lot about various evacuations, various operations in which
communist forces came in and raided villages or caught villages as they were attempting to
escape from various places. Did you see or hear of various stories or see victims of specific
attacks where it was clear that the communists were treating the Hmong not simply as

enemy combatants, but a a group of people that should be wiped out or should be treated in
a less than—well, I guess war and humanity don’t really go together, but we have this sense
that there are supposed to be rules of warfare…
Well, my impression was yes, that the [Pauses] I don’t think either side—I think both sides were
pretty brutal. And the [Pauses] you know, I have seen the refugees that came out from fighting,
because we were settling them into different areas, and a lot of them had all sorts of horror stories.
So I don’t think Weldon’s making up anything, if that’s what your question is.
Oh, no.
Because he and Pop actually did—were in some of these villages that had to be evacuated in the
middle of the night. And Paul described when the mortar rounds started coming in, and they had to
leave, so these were certainly situations that did happen. But my impression is that both of them
were pretty—both sides, whether it’s Vang Pao’s Hmong or the PL Lao, and PL Hmong fighters,
were fairly brutal. In fact, I saw the captured Vietnamese, North Vietnamese regulars in uniform at
Long Tieng at one point, so it was—you know I think they interrogated and probably executed him.
So it was a brutal thing.
(9:39) Yeah, I think Clines told the story where they brought in a uniformed North
Vietnamese, and he wanted him—I think he literally wanted to take him and use him as
public relations for—‘Look. Here clearly are Vietnamese people in Laos,
Right.
And they killed him.
Well, they had—well, I think that’s right. I didn’t actually see the person alive, I just saw artifacts,
his personal belongings after he was dead. But they were—but I think both sides were that way.
They were…
(10:16) it also seems that the Hmong were people who knew how to have a good time, even
in the midst of deprivation, there was celebration, there was drinking, there was this, that,
and the other thing. What are your memories of some more festive occasions?
TW: Well., every year, of course, there would be the Hmong New Year. And that was always held
at Sam Thong, and it was a huge event. And Vang Pao would come, of course, and the diplomatic
community were all invited. The ambassadors would all come up, and there’d be a lot of drinking
and eating and all sorts of things like that, and of course the Hmong were all dressed in their
finery—their finest costumes—their new costumes, because it was a new year. And boys and girls
would be playing a courting game. They were pitching balls and—it was kind of a courting game
they used to play, and I think I’ve got some pictures of that at some point. I’ll try to get them for
you. But oh yeah, they had a good time. And [Pauses] the alcohol used was primarily corn
whiskey—white lightning, not rice wine like the Lao would most likely be drinking. But [Pauses]
What about you, Carol?
(11:56) CM: Yeah, I remember parties, too,
that Vang Pao would have when visiting with
the other military commanders who would
come up—you know, the military leader from
Commander One—and those were always at
Long Tieng. But it would be—you know,
everybody would be included, and it would be
dancing, lots of dancing and playing, and they
would have an announcer who would

Carol Mills and Vang Pao (1st & 2nd from right) at Long
Cheng party. (Photo courtesy Mike Lynch)

announce dances among people. [To Ward:] You must have gone to a lot of those.
TW: [Yes]
CM: And I didn’t drink. I still don’t drink. So when the alcohol came around, I would say, ‘Let’s
see how much proof it is’ and somebody set it on fire. [Interviewer laughs] Or I would toss it over
my shoulder and hit the guys in back of me with whatever it was! [Chuckles] But I [Pauses] There
was always—you know, you had to drink a toast to somebody. Pop would always do all of this, so I
got out of a lot of things. I remember going to breakfast at General Vang Pao’s house, where they
would eat some kind of a soup for breakfast. And you added raw eggs to it, and it was hot enough
[Laughs, to Ward:] Do you remember that? And I couldn’t stand a raw egg in my soup, and watch
that white—I was turned off by egg whites.
TW: That was something kind of like the Vietnamese pho, you know, the meatballs and things like
that in it.
CM: And you added this raw egg. But Pop would always add my egg to his, and you know, he was
game. We went to dinners, and Pop would eat the blood pudding. The rest of us were sitting like
this [eying an imaginary blood pudding with fear and suspicion], but Pop would say, ‘Oh no, blood
pudding.’ He would eat whatever we wouldn’t. He was game. But we had a lot of parties and
dinners. When General Vang Pao was wounded, we had a big send-off party for him, because he
went to Hawaii. And everybody came. I remember that. I had learned to drive by then. And
because I didn’t drink, I was the designated person to make sure everybody got home safely. There
were only five jeeps in Sam Thong, so if I drove, everybody gave me the right of way. I wasn't that
good of a driver [Laughter] Learned on the airfield! But no, I remember happy parties.
(14:42) Now Tom, were there—
TW: There also was —I mean, you could go into the village and find somebody smoking opium.
We didn’t smoke opium, and Pop didn’t smoke opium but…
CM: We had one—
TW: It was mainly elderly people who probably had arthritis or more serious diseases. And it was a
narcotic primarily used as—there wasn’t any—I don’t remember any young people using opium,
smoking opium, or taking any kind of narcotics.
CM: We had one person who worked for us—and this is after you [Tom Ward] left—a young guy
who came up. And [Pauses] you know, back in those days, I certainly didn’t recognize drug
symptoms, nor did Pop. And finally one of the naikongs said to us, ‘Don’t you wonder why this guy
sleeps all the time?’ And we said, ‘No. We just thought he was just tired.’ And they said, ‘He
smokes opium.’ And Pop, of course, immediately he was out and sent back to the US, and I never
knew what happened to him. But we did have one—
TW: Oh, I never knew…
CM: That one American.
TW: I never knew about that.

CM: Yeah well, I’m sure it was probably kept quiet. But you could buy it down at the market in
Sam Thong. But nobody else ever bothered with it. I don’t know whether this guy had used drugs
before. I don’t know the story.
(16:28) But it’s pretty clear, isn’t it—I mean, Vang Pao didn’t want soldiers who smoked
opium.
CM: No
Certainly you didn’t want opium users on staff. So obviously a lot of hay has been made—
and I have gotten this far in the book—Dr. Weldon took great umbrage at anyone
suggesting that the United States government was participating in any way in some sort of
expansion or proliferation of the drug trade.
TW: Yeah.
CM: Oh, absolutely.
TW: Yeah, I never knew of anything like that. And I think that—I’m not saying that it didn’t
happen to happen from time to time, but I never knew of it.
CM: And I didn’t, either.
(17:08) Now another thing that he talks about—and I assume you must have at least seen it
from the sidelines—or maybe more than that—but the training of nurses and the initial
resistance, particularly by Hmong elders, to the idea that women could really do much of
anything, to say nothing of assist with medical care.
TW: Carol can talk about that.
CM: Well, Dee would really be the one, because she did a lot of the training. And I know there was
a lot of resistance, but Doc Weldon got the people in the program signed up. They did the training
and it worked out.
TW: I think his book has pictures of the first class of six—was it six nurses or eight nurses or
something like that?
CM: Right.
I’ve got it in the bag. I’ll check it in a little bit.
CM: I’ve got it in here, too.
(18:04) Could you see from your vantage point—I mean, you’ve already talked about how
Touby Lyfoung was someone who was not particularly supportive of Vang Pao. Was it
clear that there were also maybe some strains between Vang Pao and high-ranking
members of the Lao army or—?
TW: Yeah, I think there was some jealousy. [Pauses] I guess [Pauses] Long Tieng was in Region II,
Military Region II, and that was under Paksane, General Khamkhoun (was it Khamkhoun?) was the
commanding general of that region. He got along very well with Khamkhoun, but some of the
other generals didn’t like Vang Pao, simply because he was much younger and he had no pedigree,

so to speak—had not had the same kind training that they had, and they looked down on him, I’m
sure. And the other reason was that he was a Hmong. He wasn’t Lao. And that was—they couldn’t
see that a tribal person could be a general. That was hard to believe.
(19:20) And Khamkhoun was definitely—he was eventually done away with, wasn’t he? I
mean, they imprisoned him for a while, as I recall.
I think they did. And I think he left [Pauses] He ended up in Paris, I guess, after the war, but I—
yeah, he was supportive, he was very good, and he got along very well with the Americans—
particularly Weldon and Pop—and we thought a lot of—a lot of him. But he wasn’t—you know,
most of these Lao generals were not fighters. Vang Pao was a fighter. And they were—you know,
they had—well, let’s just face it. The Lao Army was not known for its fighting ability, frankly. They
were undisciplined and they did not have good leadership, which goes to a lot of the generals.
That’s why the French, earlier on, recruited the Hmong to fight for them. And that’s one reason—
because the Hmong would defend their territory against the North Vietnamese, and that had to be a
reason why the Americans supported them. You could depend on the Hmong! They weren’t going
to run at the first shot.
(20:55) I’m just curious—this is just a footnote, but did you know Bill Young at all?
[Both signify they did.]
I got a chance—I didn’t get to meet him, but we spoke on the phone when I was in Chiang
Mai.
Well, you ought to get his e-mail, and—
Well, I did—we’re now corresponding and—
Good. OK.
I’m hoping to get back there, but I’m just wondering about your impressions of him.
CM: Tom also worked in Chiang Mai—Chiang Rai.
TW: Chiang Rai, yeah. That’s when I left Laos.
CM: He was in Chiang Rai, right.
TW: Yeah. I was in Laos for five years. After I left Laos I just crossed the river and lived in
Chiang Rai for two years, and then moved to Bangkok after that. And I was in Bangkok for five
years. But I knew Bill well. I still know him well. I think his health is not so good now—I think
he’s got emphysema or something like this. But he’s a controversial guy. You haven’t mentioned
Tony Poe, either.
Oh, he’s next! [Laughter]
CM: Yeah, he was controversial!
TW: Well Bill, of course, grew up in the area, and he—I think the only time he went to the States
was when—I think he was in the army for a couple of years. But he spent his whole life here. He’s
a great linguist. He speaks not only Thai, but he speaks Wa, and I think he speaks Shan—well, Shan
and Thai are virtually the same, as is Lao, but—Shan being Thai people. But he speaks Wa and he
speaks Lahu, I believe—all these very esoteric Burmese hilltribe [Pauses] He knows the area well,
and he’s [Pauses] I find him to be very knowledgeable, and I like him a lot. But he’s a maverick, and
he’s the kind of guy—like Pop in a way—he doesn’t work well in an organization. You let him out
on his own and he’ll do what he needs to do—Tony Poe was the same way, for that matter. And I
think he ran—he worked for the Agency early on in the early ‘60s when I was there, and he lived in

Chiang Kong, across the river there from Ban Houi Sai. And you could count on him—you’d ask
him to do a difficult thing and he could do it and do it very well, and other things, like getting a
report in on time or something like that, he might not be too good at that. But—and I think he and
his superiors had some difficulties, and they let him go. I think he was an extremely good talent,
and—personally I think he knew more about Burma than he did about Laos, ‘cause he lived in
Burma a lot. But I don’t know what other questions you might want to ask about him.
(24:14) Well, that’s probably OK for now. He’s very upset with the way he’s portrayed in
Roger Warner’s book. And I asked him about that specifically because when I read it, it sort
of gave the impression of something that someone had said about him—
TW: I don’t remember what Warner said about him.
He said he deserted—sort of went off on his own and left his company.
TW: Yeah, I don’t know where he got that story. You know, Roger Warner had some [Pauses] he
had more than one inaccuracy. And he and Jiggs Weldon had a big fight.
CM: Real bad, right.
TW: Weldon threw him out of his house at one point, because—you know, he let him, stay, and he
stayed with Weldon for a week or two, and then Weldon gave him a lot of good hospitality, et
cetera, and then he questioned Weldon’s story about an incident that happened at Sam Neua, I
believe, and Weldon said, ‘Well, that’s just not exactly—that’s not—what you’re saying is not true,’
and he said, ‘Well, I’ve checked it with the Agency and they say it never happened.’ And he said,
‘The Agency people don’t know—just because the Agency people [say it didn’t happen]—you can’t
trust what they’re telling you!’ But anyway, Warner was—had some questionable information or
made some questionable decision, although I guess generally he did pretty well.
(25:41) Yeah, it’s a tough thing to amass that kind of information and get it all right.
TW: Yeah.
(25:57) Well since we brought up Tony Poe, let’s let the cat out of the bag—another, as you
say, colorful and controversial, hard-drinking, hard-charging person. What were your
memories of him?
TW: Well, I remember Tony Poe very fondly, as a matter of fact, and I think he’s got a lot of bad
press. A lot of things he—I think when he was on the job, he did his job very well. He got himself
shot several times doing his duty. And I’ll tell you one thing—if you were ever in a really tight
situation in Laos, there was no one that you’d rather have on your side than Tony Poe. ‘Cause if you
were in a very difficult situation, he would be the one guy who could get you out if anybody could
get you out. And [Clears his throat] he was obnoxious—he could be obnoxious, he’d get drunk and
raise hell, probably unreliable sometimes—would go off on his own and [Pauses] He and Vang Pao
were like that [puts fists together to show conflict]. They worked together fairly well early on, but
later on they got like that, and he married one of Vang Pao’s relatives, I think—I guess. He married
a Meo, a Hmong woman.
(27:20) Yeah—was it Vang Pao’s or Touby’s? I forget which.
It wasn’t Touby’s daughter. She—that was another story. [Carol Mills laughs]
OK! [All laugh] I’ll wait patiently for the next story to emerge, then.
TW: I can’t… [To Carol Mills] Do you remember Tony’s wife’s name?

CM: I met her a couple of times, but I don’t remember.
TW: Maybe Warner mentioned it; I’m not sure. At any rate, he and Vang Pao got into it, and Vang
Pao said, ‘I can’t work with this guy,’ and they sent him out to [Pauses]
Nam Yu.
TW: Nam Yu—118 Alternate
CM: Oh, yeah.
TW: And so he—I think he did a pretty good job out there. His critics would say, ‘Well, he was
[Pauses] they’d have all sorts of criticisms about him. His real detractors would say, ‘He was brutal
and he would collect ears and do all sorts of things like that,’ but all I can say is, my memories of
him were that he was a tough guy, a loyal guy, a very [Pauses] kind of a Special Forces extreme
stereotype, and was not afraid of being in harm’s way at all. If you had a tough job, you’d want him
doing it.
(29:00) Did you know Tony at all, Carol?
CM: I met him a few times, but by the time I went to Sam Thong he wasn’t around very much.
TW: He had gone to Nam Yu by then.
CM: Right, right. So I just met him. And of course he was always nice and polite [All laugh] when
I was around! And this is what…
TW: And I thought Warner’s description if him was rather unfair. I mean, he was certainly an
alcoholic, but the way he portrayed him, [Pauses] he did not [Pauses] I mean, you got a very negative
impression from reading that portrayal, and he did not talk about the good things he had done, and
his—you know, when I was up there, there was only two Americans in Long Tieng: there was Vint
[Lawrence] and there was Tony. And that was it. And Vint was kind of doing the intel and Tony
was doing the paramilitary stuff. So…
(30:08) Did you have much interaction with Vint?
TW: A little bit, yeah, early on. I didn’t go over there—they wouldn’t let me go over there right
away when I first arrived, because they—of course they were in the black, you know? And people in
Vientiane station, a lot of them didn’t even know that they were up there. And the only person in
Vientiane that could go up to Long Tieng from Vientiane station was Charlie Whitehurst, the
Station Chief. The only—the people who came up to Long Tieng were coming out of Udorn—you
know, Bill Lair and [Jack] Shirley and Landry, Pat Landry. They were the people coming up, and
nobody from Vientiane—Vientiane hardly even knew they were even up there! So yeah, it was—but
then later on I started going over more often.
CM: And by the time I moved up, they’d built a road.
TW: Vint was kind of a thoughtful, Ivy League Princetonian, scholarly type, and quite bright. But I
think he [Pauses] You know, it was a difficult assignment for him.

(31:38) He basically tells the story that he was told by William Casey that he had to leave at
the end of his second tour. He said he thought that if he stayed for another tour he’d turn
into another Bill Young. [Laughs] That’s what he said Casey told him: ‘It’s time for you to
go back to Washington, or your career could be over.’
In fact, his career was over pretty soon after he came back to Washington. I guess he decided he
wanted to do other things and became an artist, among other things.
(32:14) Do you think it in any way made your jobs more difficult because there was this
façade of neutrality in Laos—that allegedly we weren’t there as military advisors or in any
military capacity at all, or do you think that really didn’t make a difference to what you were
doing at all?
TW: I don’t think it made any—in 1963 and ‘4 I don’t think it made any difference at all.
CM: I don’t think it did later, either, at least the two years I was up there.
TW: I mean, you had two North Vietnamese divisions in Laos, and you had two Americans at Long
Tieng. I mean, what’s the balance? And then, of course, they started adding more and more people
over there. But early on, when I was there, it was a very limited operation. Now you did have a
Thai PARU team up there that Tony was working with.
(33:14) So what ultimately took you to Luang Prabang?
TW: Well, I was—after three years at Sam Thong, I went on home leave. And when I came back, I
would go back to Sam Thong from time to time, but I was ready for a different venue. You know, it
was tough work, and I was at Sam Thong—I guess it was two and a half years, and I was still—Pop
and I were still very, very good friends, but by that time he had—Blaine Jensen was there and he had
two or three other people there working with him. Paul came up—
CM: We had grown. Paul didn’t come until ’66.
TW: Yeah. Carol was there—
CM: I came right after you left, in October of ’65. Blaine was there, Jack came over—Jack
Williamson had been one of Tom’s Berkeley group. We had Ed McKeithen—Win McKeithen came
up—
TW: Chiang Rai—he lives in Chiang Rai now.
CM: Yeah, and Ernie [Kuhn] came, Don Sjostrom—we grew.
TW: They had a big, huge operation in the area, and I didn’t think—they didn’t need me at that
point. [Laughs]
(34:40) Obviously there was the upside of having more people to take care of what had
become a pretty important operation and to keep up a pretty heavy burden, what with the
wounded and dispensaries and everything else that had been going on. You’ve sort of
suggested that there may have been a down side, which was that you were making Military
Region II a bigger target for the Vietnamese.

TW: No I don’t think that was it. It was—I didn’t mind it on the civilian side at all. I thought what
they were doing, that was great that they were building up more and more resources for the
educational program and for the medical program and for the—getting, building fish ponds and
planning crops plans for relocated refugees. I thought that was all great. It was the fact that they
were—that they brought in the Air Force and started bombing. That’s when you got the huge
reaction from the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao, and that’s when all hell started breaking
loose. Up until then, things were kind of at a stand-off. But when you brought in all of this extra
military force, and that was concomitant with the build-up in Vietnam, well then you got—things
started falling apart. And the Hmong were a limited force; they could only sustain so much. And
this was asking too much of them. And we weren’t going to put American troops up there. And
that’s when things started unraveling. That’s why I say this escalation did not help the situation.
(36:33) Do you think even the training of Hmong T-28 pilots was a bad idea, or—
[Sighs] Well, I think that was probably something that Vang Pao wanted and they agreed to. I don’t
think that really helped all that much, to tell you the truth. There’s kind of a great thing to point out
that now our Hmong are flying T-28s, and it made them proud, I guess, but I don’t think that really
had all that much to do with the—defending north Laos form the Pathet Lao.
(37:10) So you said you were doing refugee work in Luang Prabang?
Uh-huh.
(37:14) And Carol, you went back to the States in what year before Pop lured you back?
No, I went to Thailand.
Oh, to Thailand!
I went from Laos and worked in Thailand for two years—’67, ’68.
And what did you do there?
Worked in the rural development office in AID. [Chuckles] It was kind of my niche by then. And
then it was—I was finishing my tour there when Pop came down and said, ‘Come back and work in
Laos.’
(37:43) So he told you it had gotten bad.
It had gotten bad, and he couldn’t train somebody new, and would I come back.
So what did you see that perhaps confirmed what he had said about it getting bad when you
got back?
CM: Oh, I think everything. You know, there was a lot of territory that when I had been there
before had been covered by Vang Pao’s troops that were now Pathet Lao/Vietnamese. And we
were very limited. People were more nervous. It was really a different situation. And he was right.
(38:33) And what were you [TW] noticing in those years in Luang Prabang that perhaps
were also showing that things weren’t going particularly well?
CM: You were in Thailand.
TW: Well, it does—
Oh, that’s right…
TW: By then I was—I went to Thailand in January of ’68, and so I was in Chiang Rai then but yeah,
from [Pauses] I was there in the good days [Chuckles] when things were more or less under control

and we had a small program, but it was an important program working with the Hmong. And the
war was not going badly, and the Hmong were taking care—you know, able to take care of
themselves without a lot of US support—you know, no air support or anything like that.
CM: And the soldiers were younger—the Hmong soldiers. That was—
TW: Yeah, that was another things that you—
CM: —the other thing you noticed, which was—
TW: As you noticed, the soldiers were getting younger and younger.
CM: —the kids with rifles.
TW: So that was pretty hard to see.
CM: Really sad, yeah.
(39:47) So I’m trying to remember: Steve Schofield came in about when?
CM: He was there when I was first there.
Oh really?
He must have come—yeah.
TW: Sixty-five, ’66—’66.
CM: But see, I wasn’t a curious person, either. I never knew, the whole time I worked there, that
Steve and Don and—was it Jack? Were Special [Forces]. I always thought they were AID. I didn’t
find that out until we had lunch with Don a couple years ago, and I was stunned, because I never
questioned things, and if I didn’t know something it didn’t bother me—probably why I made a good
ambassador’s secretary: because I never asked a lot of questions. [Laughter]
(40:40) Now there are at least two other people I heard a bit about, and I know Steve talked
a lot about one of them, and I think Doc Weldon’s book talks about both of them. One is a
man named Lee Chai…
CM: If he talked about him it would have been one of the medics. We had a Lee Choi who worked
as one of the dispatchers. Lee Choi Lee Seng.
TW: And Lyfoung, you know that’s the Lee clan. And so you have—you know…
And—I believe he was a Lao: Colonel Thong?
TW: Oh yeah.
Vongrasamy, if I’m pronouncing it anywhere close to correctly.
TW: Well see, this is one reason—I told you that Jiggs threw Warner out of his house. And the
reason he threw Warner out of his house was because Jiggs told Warner that Thong, who was Lao,
not Hmong, was—he was the best of the best. And he—you see, there was a group of northern
Lao that lived north of the Plain of Jars in a place called Houa Moung, up into—some of these areas
would get up into Sam Neua, actually. But these were Lao, mountain Lao. And Thong, I guess had
been trained by White Star when the Americans were there before. And he was a very effective

fighter. He was the best they had, as far as I was concerned. And at one point, he and his guerillas
attacked Sam Neua City, and actually occupied it for a very brief period, and then had to withdraw.
Jiggs reported this in his book, and Roger Warner said, ‘Well, this didn’t happen.’ That was the
incident. Now I remember it being described to me at the time by Pop, that it actually did happen.
But Warner said, ‘Well, you made this up’ or ‘You got this wrong,’ or something like that, ‘because
I’ve checked with the Agency people and they said it never happened.’ And he said, ‘I don’t care
what the Agency people said, I know it did happen,’ and so they—and he said, ‘If you don’t trust me
on this, you’ve abused my hospitality. Leave.’ [Chuckles] And that’s what happened. But it was
over that incident.
CM: There was—
TW: Thong was later killed in battle. He was awarded an American Silver Star, right? [To CM] It
was a Silver Star, I believe.
CM: Yeah. [Sounds unsure]
TW: You don’t know about that?
CM: I don’t remember.
(44:17) He was fond of wearing lots of talismans and such, wasn't he—charms and amulets?
TW: [Yes]
CM: Oh, a lot of them.
TW: I’ve got a great picture of him somewhere. He’s wearing a group of hand grenades and a
bandolier.
CM: You know, there was a time when I was there in ’66, ’67—probably ’67 when Pop let me go up
to the Plaine des Jarres. Could this have been tied in at that same time? When else would the Plain
of Jars have been free that I could have gone in to the city?
TW: No, no, this wasn't the Plain of Jars. I’m talking about Sam Neua City. This was north and
east of the Plaine des Jarres.
CM: OK, ‘cause I remember Pop saying, ‘Yeah, you could go up.’
(45:05) Well, there was that big offensive—was it in ’72 or—
TW: No, no, the dates I’m talking about had to be [Pauses]
I’m talking about hers now.
TW: Oh, hers. Yeah
There was a big offensive on the PDJ where they did go and they pretty much took over the
region for a brief time.
CM: This—no, this would have been in ’66 or ’67.
Oh, man.

CM: This was when I was—I’ve got pictures of me by a jar somewhere. And the fact that Pop let
me go—because Pop didn’t let me go to a lot of places that I wanted to go because he’d say, ‘No,
it’s not safe. You can’t go there.” But that he let me go there—
TW: Well, there might have been a place near the Plain of Jars. I’m sure it wasn't Phonsavan or
someplace like that in the middle of the Plain of Jars. It could have been on the edge where there
were Jars
CM: I remember Mai See went with me—
TW: Mai See was Thong’s wife
CM: —if you ever run into Mai See. Moua Dong’s—yeah.
(46:14) Where does she live? Do you know?
In Colorado. I have her daughter’s number. Is it here or somewhere else?
TW: She later married an American, right?
CM: Yeah. And they had a couple of children.
TW: An American soldier who was—who didn’t turn out—
Mai See? Was she Lao or Hmong?
CM: She was Hmong. Mentioned…[Pauses] I would try the daughter Nancy’s number, because
every time I send her something, it comes back. Mai See Martin.
TW: She married a guy, a soldier—a sergeant named Larry Martin who was in Vientiane later on.
But they divorced, I’m sure—
CM: A long time ago.
TW: A long time ago.
CM: And her daughter’s Nancy, and I know the phone number had from Mai See doesn’t work, but
her daughter Nancy…
(47:18) Well Carol, what do you remember about the days leading up to and including the
evacuation of Sam Thong, when you were forced to relocate to Ban Xon?
CM: You mean in 1970? Just that life was very hectic, and the North Vietnamese/Pathet Lao kept
coming closer and closer. And every night it was kind of—you know, they’re 15 miles away, they’re
10 miles away. At one point Pop was worried about me. We couldn’t evacuate because he’d
promised he wouldn’t. But one of the naikongs said, ‘She can come and stay in my house.’ And so I
went there and stayed a few nights, but they had bedbugs, and I finally after the second night said to
Pop, ‘You know, I think I’d rather be captured, because I can’t stand’—I was itching all over! It was
awful. And it turned out after Sam Thong was lost, that the man I’d been staying with was Pathet
Lao—one of the naikongs.

TW: Oh really?
CM: He was one of the newer ones. Yes. Mai See I had trained as a secretary, and this is my
second trip to Sam Thong—I had a new house, and Mai See lived in my old house. And we used to
spend the night together. She would dress me up in all black and wrap my hair in case we had to
evacuate, so that they wouldn’t immediately say, ‘She’s an American.’ But she spent a lot of time
worrying about my eyes. And she gave me French silver coins that if we had to go out, we wouldn’t
have kip, which wouldn’t mean anything.
TW: We had piasters.
CM: And we had it all planned. They built—I don’t even remember who ‘they’ were now, but
somebody came in and—behind that house and Dr. Khammoun’s house they built a bunker. And
Mai See and I had gone out and crawled in the bunker, and decided if it ever happened, there was no
way we were going in that bunker, and that we were going to go down to the village and out with all
the other people.
(49:51) It wouldn’t surprise me if Steve Schofield was a part of that [effort to build the
bunker].
He could have been! All I know is boy, we had that bunker out there. And so we would go to sleep
and people would come and tap on the window and we’d jump out of bed, and it would be one of
the guys saying, ‘We just want you to know that everything’s OK.’ [Laughs]
Thanks a lot! [Laughs]
CM: That’s right! And then we would sit and she would cook rice every night that we could take
with us when we had to walk out. I look at that now—I cannot see me walking up and down those
hills! But I had a radio that the military had given me that I could use to connect with pilots so they
could find us. And I was convinced that if we had to walk out, somebody would come and get us.
But as it happened, the last night I was there, we heard a lot of gunfire—I mean a lot. So the next
morning they came up and said, ‘We’re going to evacuate. You can take one suitcase.’ And we kind
of spent that whole day—planes rushing in, and we were mobbed with people who wanted to go
out. It was really sad. They evacuated people from the hospital—I mean, I don’t know who else. A
lot of people left—not our staff. We left on the last plane. I remember I had two Siamese kittens—
cats by then that Pop had given me, and they said I couldn’t take them. And I cried and said, ‘I can’t
leave my cats. They’ll eat them.’ That’s all I could think of: my poor cats. So finally the pilot who
was going to take me out said, ‘You can take them in a box.’ And I did. And we flew out to
Vientiane that evening, and I worked with Pop and Doc Weldon all evening. They were dictating
memos, I was typing them, and we were sending them in. The next morning at dawn Pop and Doc
Weldon were out on airplanes looking for our staff that was walking out to try to help them get out.
I could never believe, I guess, we didn’t take them, but there wasn't room. There were, I guess,
priority lists. And that’s what I remember. Two weeks later they took Sam Thong back, and some
of the guys went to my house, and they said it was destroyed. They had cut up all my clothing, they
had opened canned food and dumped it on everything. They brought back my Bible. It was really
an emotional time. We set up the office in Vientiane.
TW: This was ‘7—?

CM: This was ’70. March of ’70. March 17, 1970. I always remember that. And so then I had an
office in Vientiane, in which this guy, Moua Dong worked for us. Moua Dong was Moua Chong’s
brother, and he had been our gener—no, that was Jee Vue. Jee Vue we trained in the office, and
Galen Beery came in to help also. And then I used to commute between Vientiane and [Site] 272. I
always said I could have taken a two-week trip and everybody would have thought I was at one place
or the other, because it was all an honor system. I’d say I was going up to 272, or I’d say to 272,
‘I’m gonna stay in Vientiane a few days.’ And that’s how we operated, but it worked out.
(54:09) Do you think the move, and the—not just symbolic, but the real loss of Sam Thoing
has an effect on Pop? Do you think this was a pretty significant blow to him?
CM: [Pauses] You know, he was so involved working with the refugees, I don’t know whether it did
or not.
TW: I never noticed it—
CM: I didn’t.
TW: —and he kept on working with refugees—
CM: He did.
TW: —no matter where they were. I mean, he didn’t—he just kept right on going. He just
changed his office, that’s all.
CM: Right. And after even he retired from AID, you know, he spent his time in Thailand working
with people—the Hmong who were there.
TW: Right.
CM: I mean, this was his life.
(55:02) Yeah, very clearly.
CM: Yeah. Yeah, they were…
(55:08) So if I remember correctly, Ban Xoun was a little lower than Sam Thong—
CM: oh, much lower.
—so you had problems with malaria and maybe some other difficulties as well. What were
the challenges—
CM: Well, we had problems with malaria in Sam Thong when I—
Oh really?
Yeah. I mean, one of my jobs up there—I had a memo from Charlie Mann saying, ‘Your
responsibility is to see that every employee takes—was it quinine we were taking back then once a
week? And ‘to see that they don’t get malaria’, because people were always coming down with
malaria, and they always knew it. They got it so often that they knew what their symptoms were.
TW: Doc Weldon certainly had it.
CM: Yeah.

TW: And it would recur every now and then.
CM: It would. So I don’t think we probably even had as much illness as I remember at 272. I
mean, maybe we didn’t and I just didn’t pick up on it, because I didn’t live at 272, whereas at Sam
Thong I lived there, and if somebody was sick, I’d be the one who’d take them hot soup or
whatever.
(56:27) I think for most Americans, obviously, the Vietnam War is it. It was the war in
Vietnam. And maybe they realize we went into Cambodia, and maybe Laos is on the radar
screen somewhere, but it doesn’t seem that often that it is. What would you say to the
average less-than-fully informed American about the role that Laos and the Hmong and
other hill tribes played in assisting with the American war effort in Southeast Asia?
TW: Well, I think it was part of the situation. I think [Pauses] I see it as separate—of course, it’s all
part of the same overall war, but I felt that we were certainly holding our own early on. And I say,
when they escalated, that’s when things really started going bad. And some people might say that’s
what happened in Vietnam as well. [Chuckles]
CM: That’s right.
Yeah, half a million troops on the ground by ’68 , I suppose, would get somebody’s
attention.
CM: No, because from what I understood, the Lao were not fighters. Now you [TW] can help me
with this, but I heard stories from people who’d been in Laos a long time when I first when, and
they would say that the Pathet Lao would have to attack a village. Well, the Pathet Lao would send
word to this village: ‘We’re coming in to attack you tonight,’ and they would come in shooting in
the air because they didn’t want to have to kill anybody. And the Lao were the same way, so there
weren’t really battles, up until that point, where people died, that it was kind of just people turning
back and forth, but were not going to kill you. It was also one of my great stories in Vientiane, is
when they had a dog problem. Dogs ran in packs, and they were really dangerous, but the Lao being
Buddhist said we can’t kill the dogs. And then they came up with the solution: they would buy a lot
of meat and they’d poison part of it, and they wouldn’t the other part, and they would toss it out and
it was the dog’s choice which meat it would eat.[Laughter] It got rid of the dog problem, and it
must have salved their conscience that they were not poisoning the dogs. It was the dog’s choice to
eat the poisoned meat!
TW: It was the dog’s choice!
CM: Yeah, but [Sighs] And then it got more dangerous. And that’s…
TW: I’m going to have to take off in a little bit.
(59:37) Well, let’s just talk about—we talked just a bit about your responsibilities in Luang
Prabang, and you said during that period things were still relatively good, things were
relatively stable. What kinds of responsibilities did you have?
TW: Well, I was kind of Pop’s assistant, and I would be in touch with… [Pauses] This is before
Carol came up. I would be just doing what he wanted me to do, and we would split some

responsibilities and I’d be loading—he’d tell me what the priorities were and where the rice was
needed. You might call into Vientiane and say, ‘We need rice drops at such and such locations.’
There could be—a lot of these places the rice drops weren’t always very successful because you
couldn’t—the rice would scatter, the bags would break, so a lot of times they would land rice on a
Caribou at Sam Thong and we would then disburse it on Helios or Porters to different locations.
That way we were sure it got to where it was supposed to go. So I was involved in rice distribution,
medical supply distribution, getting out agricultural implements where that was needed, visiting
locations, seeing—doing a needs assessment—you know, what kind of support they required,
bringing people back to the hospital who needed medical attention, that sort of thing. Then also
writing—seeing that reports were sent into Vientiane, getting things that we needed from Vientiane
up there. I went to Thailand to get fish, I went other places to get seed and supplies. I was
coordinating work with the Refugee Relief office in Vientiane with regards to rice supplies and that
sort of thing.
(1:01:57) Carol, you said things just got worse, and obviously you were talking about more
than the dog situation. [Laughs]
[Laughs] Well no, that was way before in Vientiane when I lived there. No, I meant up in Sam
Thong towards the end. I mean, it was sad. It was sad to me seeing everything going, because I
guess I had watched it grow. And then it was gone. And the Hmong people felt it even more. I
mean, pictures that I had… Moua Dong came to visit me—oh, it’s been 15 years ago, and we pulled
out my pictures and he was looking at them. And he said, ‘Can I have some of these?’ because his
children had been born in Sam Thong. And he said, ‘They’ve never seen what it looked like where
we lived,’ and he took a lot of them home with him. And I said, ‘Of course you can have them. It
means more to you.’ And I think to me that’s the sad part. His daughter who was at university in
North Carolina at the time wrote a letter saying how wonderful to see these pictures where I had
been born, because they had talked about it, but I hadn’t seen it. So I think that was the sad thing.
And like Paul, I guess, said, General Vang Pao said, ‘You’ll walk and I won’t.’ And people had said
that to me. I remember saying to somebody up there once, ‘It’s so beautiful up here. How lucky
you are to live here.’ And they said, ‘Yes, but only if it’s peaceful. You’ll leave if trouble comes, and
we’ll be here.’ And you know, you felt that, ‘cause then I thought, OK, troubles come, and we
probably caused a lot of it. Who knows how long they might have lived there if the Americans
hadn’t come in and said, ‘Fight for us.’ I don’t know.
(1:04:24) Did either of you have a sense in these last days as things were getting worse and
ultimately there was a so-called ceasefire and provisional government (but ultimately Vang
Pao did leave in 1975)—do you remember reflecting back then or even perhaps in years past
if you felt that the United States had an obligation to do anything once they themselves
decided to pull out? Or was that not something that you wrestled with very often?
CM: Oh no, very much so. We had an obligation to the Hmong. I mean, they had given their lives
to fight for us, and had died! Yeah, very much so. I thought the Hmong deserved to come to the
US and find a new life, because life wouldn’t have been good for them in Laos—not with the
communist government. And the ones who were left there, I think felt that very much. You [TW]
must have felt the same way.
TW: Yeah, I agree with you. Yeah, I felt the same way. We certainly had an obligation. And we
did bring—get a number of them out. There were a lot that for one reason or another were left
behind. And many of them finally made their way to Thailand. And we had people that had been
working up north, working in Thailand as well, with the Hmong and the Lao who crossed the

border to help them get out. And if they worked for the Americans, they got top priority. But the
others who had not, who were just civilian refugees, they were in a very difficult situation. One, the
Thai didn’t want them, two, they were Hmong, not Lao. A lot of them had limited Lao language
and less Thai language skills, so the Thai looked down on them. And they were agriculturalists and
they didn’t have a place to grow rice or do anything. They had them in a camp. And a lot of those
people got out, a lot of them didn’t. Some of them tried to go back to Laos recently, I guess and—
the Lao don’t want them back. And so they’re in a desperate situation. I think in Petchabun
province is where one of the camps is.
Yeah.
It’s a bad, bad situation. I think the US should support them and help get them out.
I think it all goes back to this question that you just talked about, which is, ‘Did the United
States have an obligation, and before that, did Bill Lair, as a representative of the United
States government, make any promises to Vang Pao when they first met that would have led
them to believe that if things went bad that they should have expected the United States to
do something?
TW: Not to my knowledge, but Blaufarb is the one that says we had the obligation and we didn’t
follow through on it. I don’t remember what he said about Lair’s role in the whole thing, but that
was certainly his thesis.
[New track begins.]
(0:00) [There was one] question I wanted to ask you both, and that was, did you ever hear
the word ‘Hmong’ when you were in Laos?
CM: No.
TW: I heard it—I think I heard it at one point, but we always used the word ‘Meo’ [sounds like the
sandwich spread] or ‘Miao’ [sounds like a cat—‘meow’]. The British used Miao, and the French
used Meo. And they referred to themselves as Meo, not Hmong. And this is a—I won’t say
political correctness, but you could call it that, because—well, it’s true. If they feel that ‘Meo’ is an
insult, well then they—well, you shouldn’t call them that. But they referred to themselves as Meo, as
far as I recall. Although I did—I think I was—someone did mention to me at one point that they
liked to be called Hmong, or that was another way, or that was the way they referred to themselves,
maybe.
(0:55) Yeah, in China they call themselves Miao.
CM: And I never heard the word ‘Hmong’. Not until years later.
[Again, Interviewer says his thanks, interview concludes.]

